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I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Grokster' and the
filing of thousands of lawsuits against individual consumers of music2
have focused public attention on the economics of musical
entertainment. Grokster itself involved liability of intermediaries who
facilitate infringement by individual consumers of music, but it
reawakened debate over fundamental premises of copyright law,
including what music consumers should be privileged to do with
music. The copyright laws are intended to-indeed, the Congress is
empowered only to write copyright laws that-create incentives for
the production of creative works. In order to do that, intellectual
property law must walk a fine line between making it too easy for
people to steal creative work product and making it illegal for people
to enjoy it.
1. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 125 S.Ct.
2764 (2005) (reversing court of appeals and holding that distributor of music-file-sharing
software could be liable for copyright infringement by users of software upon proof that
distributors clearly expressed intent that software be used for infringing activities).
2. See Andrew C. Humes, The Day the Music Died: The RIAA Sues its Consumers,
38 IND. L. REV. 239, 239 (2005) (reporting September 2003 RIAA lawsuits against 261
defendants alleged to have downloaded and uploaded copyrighted music); Brett J. Miller,
The War Against Free Music: How the RIAA Should Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the
MP3, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 303, 312 (2005) (describing more than 9,000 lawsuits
against music downloaders by music industry).
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This article explores the economics of popular music creation
and consumption in the wake of Grokster and suggests the most
appropriate role for copyright law in striking a socially beneficial
balance between those who create and distribute music and those
who consume it.
As technology changes, it increases and decreases risks of certain
kinds of market failure, altering the incentives to create and perform
music. Before Gutenberg invented the printing press, one who
wanted to listen to music had to be close enough to hear the
composer perform.3 The printing press increased the scope of markets
by allowing performance of another's music without any contact
between composer and performer, but it also created risks of
unauthorized mass reproduction of the written representation of
music. Before invention of the earliest sound recording devices,
consumers of music had to be present at alive performance.' Sound
recording changed all that.
Each later technological revolution-improvements in the
techniques for manufacturing phonograph records in large quantities,
the invention and commercialization of magnetic recording, the
development of low-cost techniques for producing digital recordings
on cheap plastic media, and most recently a combination of advanced
compression techniques and greatly increased bandwidth available to
most users of the Internet, altered equilibria5 and raised questions
about the proper balance between law and technology in preserving
appropriate incentives for producing and consuming music.
The impact of technology on the music market is widely
recognized by the public and by legal experts. But, too often,
observers only focus on the possibility for technological advances to
reduce incentives to create and distribute music. Insufficient attention
usually is given to the tendency of some of the same technological
advances to increase incentives to create and produce because they
reduce costs of original producers.
3. Or close enough to hear someone who had been given a handwritten score
perform.
4. It was also possible that someone with particularly good musical talent could hear
a performance and memorize or transcribe a musical score, and play the work for
themselves.
5. In economics, equilibrium is the state at which supply and demand are in balance.
Technological changes often produce a new equilibrium at which the quantity of a good
supplied and demanded is greater or less than at a previous equilibrium, and the price may
be higher or lower.
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This article builds on work done by the author when print
publishers and some authors were concerned that the combination of
the personal computers and the Internet would stunt creation and
publication of literary works.' The article explores the economics of
music production in a world in which compact disc recorders are part
of almost every personal computer, a world in which studio quality
audio recordings can be produced in anyone's living room with
equipment costing only a few thousand dollars, a world in which all
listeners can carry music players wherever they go, and a world in
which robust markets exist for exchange of music through the
Internet using software such as Grokster and commercial services
such as iTunes, Rhapsody, Google, and MySpace.
This article argues that the bleak scenarios painted in public
policy venues by the music industry about the risks posed by the new
technologies are considerably exaggerated. The reality is that the new
technologies do not threaten the position of musicians and other
creative actors but are rather the embedded capital of an elaborate,
sophisticated, and arguably bloated system of intermediation that was
designed to deal with old technologies. The system that the RIAA
and MPAA are suing schoolchildren to protect is obsolete, and never
had much to do with creative effort.7 Indeed, as Professor Michael
Carroll has observed,8
removing copyright protection from musical works and sound
recordings would not eliminate professional musicmaking. On the
contrary, historical evidence strongly suggests that demand for the
services of a class of professional musicians and composers would
be sufficient to induce society to find alternative means to enable
this group to practice its art.-
The vigor of the industry's attack on new technologies has more to do
with fear of new forms of competition than protection of creativity.10
6. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and Innovation in the Global Information
Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261 (1996).
7. See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM & ENT. L. J. 1, 2
(2004) (existing law was designed to facilitate a world in which music distributors needed
substantial capital investment in printing presses, trains or trucks, warehouses, broadcast
towers or communications satellites).
8. Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway? How We Came to View Musical
Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405 (2004) (describing competing
positions on whether music should be protected by copyright law and how much).
9. Id. at 1412.
10. See Miller, supra note 2, at 321-22 (explaining that industry has not embraced
MP3 technology, even though it could "virtually eliminate.., marketing costs," because of
fear of competition from independent bands).
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Writing and enforcing law aimed at protecting these obsolete
methods of intermediation represent dead weights on society.
Michael Carroll again said it well: "From a utilitarian perspective, we
should be open to the possibility that copyright no longer is the best
tool for stimulating musical innovation, even if copyright law remains
cost-justified for more expensive forms of expression, such as feature
films.""
At the very least, legislators should resist pressures from the
music industry to expand copyright protection. Instead copyright law
should be interpreted, or amended if necessary, to permit informal,
non-commercial file sharing-conduct which will occur in any event,
regardless of what the law says, and which the law should not
discourage because it actually encourages further creative effort.
Regardless of what the law says, however, the music industry will
not prevail in the end, any more than other protectors of the status
quo have prevailed in the past. Technology and market forces will
win. Consumers and producers of music-and society-will benefit.
This article begins by recalling that copyright law is justified only
by the need to prevent a particular kind of market failure-free riding
on the creative effort of another. It summarizes how the substance of
copyright law has evolved in response to technological change, in a
manner that was perceived by legislators to alter the risk of free
riding.
Then it moves to an analysis of the market for music, as shaped
by the new economics of the complementary processes of production
and consumption. This part of the article argues that new
technologies reduce the risk of free riding because they narrow the
cost gap between producer and pirate.12 It also argues that
opportunities for new musicians will be enhanced by file sharing and
file-sales technologies, coupled with low-cost Web-based advertising
and virtual-community technologies. Throughout, the article uses
actual or estimated costs, revenues, production and consumption
functions. It frankly acknowledges that the opportunities for
additional empirical investigation of music production and
consumption is vast-far beyond the reach of a single investigator or
article. It crystallizes these opportunities for follow-up by the author
and others in other articles.
11. Carroll, supra note 8, at 1413-14.
12. For ease in exposition, this article uses the term "producer" to encompass
composers, performers, producers and distributors. It uses the term "pirate" to refer to
anyone who sells music without authorization from the rights holder in that music.
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The article explores new business models for musicians and
consumers of music, offering two case studies of Indie musicians'
3
who are using new technologies in very different ways.
Finally, the article concludes by considering various proposals
advanced by stakeholders and commentators for reforming music
copyright law, some of which include the imposition of new taxes on
factor inputs for music production and consumption. It argues that
fair use should be interpreted more broadly, but that regardless of
legal interpretations, a new equilibrium will result over the next few
years: the major music labels fade from the scene and music
consumers continue to enjoy the benefits of downloading music,
sometimes paying for it and sometimes exchanging it with their
friends, which in turn will increase the demand for paid music. At the
same time, consumers will be drawn to smaller venues at which as-yet
undiscovered musicians perform.
H. Coase and Copyright
Why should the law concern itself with the exchange of music?
Music is art. Those who generate music and those who enjoy it should
be empowered in a free society to decide for themselves how they will
generate it and enjoy it. Ronald H. Coase teaches that rational actors
will make good decisions about allocating their resources in the
absence of law.' If a singer is willing to sing a song for $1.00 and
someone wants to listen to his song and is willing to pay a $1.50 for it,
they will reach an agreement under which the listener will pay
something between $1.00 and $1.50 to the singer, who will then
perform for the listener. Of course the singer and the listener have to
find each other before they can bargain. The cost of finding each
other is what is called a "transaction cost," which the Coase Theorem
explicitly does not take into account. 15
Another kind of transaction cost exists. It may be that the singer
is willing to sing for a dollar but is concerned that the listener will
steal his song, neither giving him credit for it nor preserving the
market for future paying listeners. In other words, the listener also
may be able to sing and, having heard the song, may appropriate it
and sing it for others who are just as happy to pay the original listener
as to pay the original singer.
13. "Indie" musicians are those who perform or record professionally but have no
relationships with major labels.
14. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
15. Coase, supra note 14, § V, at 7.
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It is not impossible for the original two parties to take this
concern into account in their bargaining. The original singer may say
to the original listener, "I "will pay you $.25 for your promise not to
tell anyone the lyrics of my song or to sing it to anyone else. The
listener, more interested in listening than in singing, agrees. The two
parties offset the original payment for the singing against the payment
for not appropriating the song and end up with a bargain under which
the singer sings and the listener only listens and pays somewhere
between $.75 and $1.25.
Of course the original listener may break his promise and sing
the song in the public park. Detecting such a breach of his promise
and punishing him for it represent additional transaction costs.
The possibility that a consumer may become a competitor
reflects the fact that music-especially recorded music-is what
economists call a "public good." Public goods are distinguished from
private goods by two characteristics: non-excludability, and non-
rivalness. Non-excludability means that when the singer sings the
song, anyone nearby can hear it. The singer cannot exclude those who
have not paid unless he builds (or rents) a soundproof wall. Non-
rivalness"6 means that the singer still has the song even after he has
performed it and that the original listener may sing it for someone
else and still keep it in his head and sing it again.
Performed music is not a perfect public good. Performed music is
excludable and thus lacks one of the two defining characteristics of a
public good. One can perform-and performances typically occur-in
an enclosed space from which those who have not paid can be
excluded. Performed music also is not entirely non-rival, either.
Consumers get to see the pretty (or otherwise interesting) faces of the
performers as well as hearing their music. Attending a performance is
more than simply hearing the music; it is an experience. One cannot
internalize the performance fully and thus "keep" it while passing it
on to someone else. Musicians have little difficulty in making Coasian
contracts that protect themselves from transaction costs associated
with live performances of music." The only risk is that someone in the
audience goes out and sings the song later-absent recording
technology discussed later in this section.
16. "Non-rivalness" also is known as non-depletability.
17. See, e.g., www.lollapalooza.com (prohibiting video or audio recording equipment
and professional-quality cameras, in "info"/"prohibited items" section);
http://www.soldierfield.net/facilityGuide.aspx (prohibiting video or movie cameras).
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Natural limitations on human capacity historically kept these
transaction costs of public goods in music within tolerable bounds.
Not all listeners can sing well enough that anyone wants to hear them
as opposed to the original singer. Even those listeners who sing well
may have poor memories, have no interest in performing, or be less
attractive physically than the original singer.
Technology reduces the impact of these human limitations and
transforms much music into public goods. If the listener listens, not to
a live performance, but to a recording of the music, the listener need
not be able to sing or to remember the song. She can play her
recording for others without paying the singer again. And with the
advent of digital representation of sound waves and the proliferation
of devices that can copy these digital representations, it is impossible
for the one who produces an original recording to prevent anyone
who possesses that recording from making a perfect copy, copy
protection aside. Now the original listener can easily and cheaply
produce multiple copies of the song, distribute them widely, and
thereby deprive the original singer of revenues that would otherwise
flow to the original singer from everyone who wants to listen to the
song. In addition, anyone who possesses the original recording has
little incentive not to duplicate it because she can keep it even as she
gives the perfect copy to her friends. In other words, digitally
recorded music possesses the non-rival and non-excludable
characteristics more strongly than a live music performance, and
therefore increases the risk of free riding.
Free riding is a transaction cost that looms large in the market
for music (and for other forms of entertainment). If an original
listener internalizes a song and performs it for others, or duplicates
and distributes a recording of the song, both the original listener and
the new listeners obtain a free ride on whatever investment the singer
made in creating the music and lyrics. The listener who then becomes
a singer gets a free ride on the creative effort although he cannot get a
free ride on the original singer's voice quality, vocal performance
ability or looks. The original listener who becomes a record
distributor gets a free ride on everything. Not only that, the original
listener-the one who breached his contract with the original singer-
is not the only one who can duplicate the recording. Anyone who has
it can duplicate it. That opens up the original singer to the possibility
of free riding not only by his original listener, with whom he can, after
all, make a contract prohibiting whatever he wants to prohibit, but
also by everyone else in the world who gets possession of the sound
waves representing his music in circumstances that permit them to
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [29.3
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record it. The original singer is not in a position to enter into
contracts with all of those unidentifiable third parties.
Recorded music exhibits both characteristics of a "public good"
to such an extent that a simple model of private contract has difficulty
making enforceable deals to manage transaction costs. Because of the
law's inability to readily handle these transaction costs, performers
will make fewer deals than they would in a transaction-cost-free
world and will insist on higher prices because they fear that listeners
will steal their songs."' Listeners will make fewer deals and insist on
paying lower prices than they would in a transaction-cost-free world
because they believe they can obtain the same music elsewhere for
free or at a lower price. Only search costs 9 make them willing to pay
anything at all.2' The Coase paradigm therefore suggests a role for
law to reduce the transaction costs and make a Pareto optimal
equilibrium2" more nearly obtainable.
Contrast that with a world in which music is only performed live
and not recorded. In that world, the transaction costs are tolerable.
Designing a legal regime to manage the transaction costs and
promote optimal resource allocation with respect to creation and
consumption of music would be a relatively low priority. But the
possibility of recording music and passing along the recordings
dramatically changes the economic equation.
The economic harm from free riding on recorded music may be
even greater because, if the original singer produces recordings as
well as performances, he also must have the capital goods and skill to
make acceptable recordings.' Depending on the available
technology, it may be possible for free riders to duplicate the
recording with much less expensive capital equipment and far less
18. The higher price approximates a Coasian bargain in which the original listener
implicitly says to the original singer, "I will pay you a little more for the privilege of
possibly duplicating your music and giving (or selling) it to others."
19. "Search costs" are all of the costs, in terms of money and time, incurred to find an
equivalent product from another source.
20. See Litman, supra note 7, at 28 (recording industry and its "bookkeeping tricks"
barely manage to subsidize its searching for and identifying the "musicians whose work
will prove to be worth listening to").
21. A Pareto-optimal equilibrium is one in which no one can be made better off
without making someone worse off. It reflects the most efficient distribution of societal
resources, distributive justice aside.
22. He can buy the capital goods, or he can rent them from a recording studio. He
can buy skill in the form of training for himself.
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skill than is necessary to make the original recording.' The third
party now gets a free ride not only on the voice training and creative
effort of the original singer but also on: that part of the original
singer's capital investment not necessary for mere duplication of the
recording.4
If the original singer is commercially motivated and has invested
in voice training, put forth the creative effort, and bought the capital
equipment and skilled labor necessary to produce recorded music in
order to sell it to as many consumers as possible, his business model is
threatened by the possibility of free riding. A third-party free rider,
not having to make the same investment as the original singer, can
make money by selling the original singer's work at a price less than
the original singer must charge to recover a reasonable return on his
investment.
The result, once everyone in the market understands all this, will
be the underproduction of recorded music by those seeking at least
enough revenue to recover their costs. At the limit, no profit-seeking
musicians will record music; they will only perform it live.' The
quantity of music that would be performed and consumed through
recordings will be subtracted from the goods available to society.
Both technology and law can help avoid this artistic catastrophe.
Technology can make it more difficult to duplicate recorded music
except through equipment or knowledge possessed by the original
singer, thus increasing the cost and thereby reducing the incidence of
free riding.
The law can reduce various kinds of transaction costs, including
free riding. At the most basic level, the law can make the contracts
between the original singer and the original listener enforceable,
thereby reducing transaction costs associated with enforcement of the
23. The original singer needs recording and mixing equipment and CD mastering
equipment (if he delivers recorded music on CDs). The free rider only needs a CD
"burner," which comes as standard equipment on most computers.
24. See William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An
Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2000) (Landes offers the same
explanation of the economics of free riding, albeit outside the music context).
25. In the interest of clarity, this conclusion overstates the risk. In the real world,
some musicians always will make recordings, even if they have to give them away or even
subsidize their production, simply because they want others to hear their music.
Nevertheless, rock stars like David Bowie predict that touring would be the only way for
performers to make money because music would "become like running water or
electricity." Marie Connolly & Alan B. Krueger, Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular
Music, at 24, available at, http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/499.pdf (last visited June
16, 2005) [hereinafter "Princeton Study"].
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original deal.26 More ambitiously, the law can impose a duty on
anyone in possession of a song not to make it available to others
without the permission of the original singer and without honoring
whatever terms the original singer may insist upon for subsequent
availability of his artistic work. For example, the law might give the
original singer a statutory or common law right in the music and lyrics
and impose a duty on everyone else not to reproduce, distribute,
publicly perform, publicly display or prepare derivative works of the
original song. 27 Such legal regimes reduce the risk of free riding by
imposing potential costs on free riders-litigation costs and the
prospect of fines or damages for violating their duties. Even if not
everyone violating the duties gets caught, there is some non-zero
probability of getting caught and punished. Rational persons tempted
to engage in free riding will calculate the expected value of the costs
imposed by law.
The law also could go further, and seek to reduce other
transaction costs, such as search costs, either directly or indirectly, by
creating incentives for private voluntary efforts to make it easier for
singers and listeners to find each other and make deals.
The Coase paradigm not only assumes zero transaction costs, it
ignores questions of distributive justice. A society where distributive
justice prevails is not only one in which resources are allocated
efficiently; it also is one in which each member enjoys resources she
deserves, in a moral sense. Distributive-justice considerations are
sources of argument as much as they are sources of principles for law.
Does each member of society deserve, in a moral sense, to be able to
enjoy music? Does each person with musical talent deserve to be able
to adapt music that already exists? Does each musician deserve to
have his art recognized as his creation and to be able to make a living
off of making music? Affirmative answers to each of these questions
are plausible, but affirmative answers to all of the questions offer
little guidance as to how copyright law should strike balances among
competing claims.
26. Even in the absence of a legal regime to enforce contracts, some contracts
nevertheless could be enforced. A singer might refuse to sing again for a listener who
breached an earlier contract, or demand a higher price for the next performance. She also
might beat up a breaching listener. These possibilities would provide a deterrent for
breaching-at least for some listeners.





As the preceding section suggests, copyright law is justified by
the need to preserve creative incentives by plugging holes in the
market. As the risk of free riding and other transaction costs changes,
the intensity of copyright protection should change. The music
industry claims that new technologies have increased the risk of free
riding. In fact, they have reduced it. Moreover, the technologies that
threaten the position of established stakeholders dramatically have
changed other transaction costs for both artists and consumers,
mostly reducing them.
B. History
The earliest proprietary protection for music was effectuated
through a printing franchise for printed musical scores. The right
belonged to the publisher, rarely to the composer. 2' After copyright
law came into existence, music generally was treated like any other
printed work, with protection focused on the printer or bookseller.
The first U.S. copyright statute, enacted in 1790, protected only
"maps, charts and books. ' ' 29 Music, drama, and works of art obtained
protection only later.3 °
When Congress debated the 1909 Copyright Act, technology
existed for manufacturing and playing sound recordings, but not for
copying them. Accordingly, when the drafters added protection for
composers of music, they focused entirely on written scores, and not
31on recordings.
The 1909 Copyright Act included, however, among the exclusive
rights reserved to the composer, the right to perform the work
publicly.32 There ensued a struggle over whether radio broadcasts of
28. Carroll, supra note 8, at 1409.
29. William A. Carleton, Copyright Royalties for Visual Artists: A Display-Based
Alternative to the Droit de Suite, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 510, 547 (1991) (quoting original
statute).
30. See Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine 382, 5 F.Cas. 999, 1000-01 (C.C.N.Y. 1829)
(referring to the possibility that a "volume of... music" could be entitled to copyright
protection under the original copyright law; protectable "book" including "one sheet, as
the words of a song or the music accompanying it"; quoting Statute of February 3, 1831, 4
Stat. 436, as including "musical composition" among the works eligible for copyright).
31. Robert J. Delchin, Musical Copyright Law: Past, Present and Future of Online
Music Distribution, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 346 (2004) [hereinafter Delchin].
32. Id. at 347.
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musical performances violated this right,33 resolved in the 1931
Supreme Court case of Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., which said
not only that a radio broadcast, but also that public redistribution of
the broadcast in a hotel, constituted a public performance. ' This was
a major victory for the music industry and a major defeat for the
broadcasting industry. Two collective rights organizations, Broadcast
Music Incorporated ("BMI") and the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP"),35 formed to
administer the performance right by licensing blocks of musical works
to radio stations.
But forty years later, in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken,36 the Supreme Court held that playing a radio in a small
business did not violate the public performance right. The radio
station had a license from ASCAP; the small business owner did not.
The Supreme Court observed that rights conferred by the Copyright
Act are limited. "No license is required by the Copyright Act, for
example, to sing a copyrighted lyric in the shower.
' 3
1
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution,
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.38
The court was motivated by two policy considerations: the
impracticability of enforcing a contrary rule, and the fact that the
copyright owner already had received a fair return on his investment
by the license of the music to the radio broadcaster-a factor absent
39from the 1931 case.
33. In the early days, radio stations did not broadcast music recordings because of
poor quality, they broadcast live performances. Music copyright owners later pushed for
broadcasts of recordings in order to promote demand for live performances and for sheet
music. Id. at 347.
34. 283 U.S. 191, 201 (1931) (holding, inter alia, that a separate public performance
occurs each time a radio receiver transforms radio waves into sound waves. "There is no
difference in substance between the case where a hotel engages an orchestra to furnish the
music and that where, by means of the radio set and loud-speakers here employed, it
furnishes the same music for the same purpose. In each the music is produced by
instrumentalities under its control.").
35. See K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp, 372 F.2d 1, 2-3 (9th Cir. 1967)
(describing ASCAP).
36. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
37. Id. at 155.
38. Id. at 156.
39. Id. at 162-64.
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As sound recording technology improved and magnetic tape was
commercialized, the music industry began, in the 1950s, to seek legal
protection for sound recordings. Congress' finally responded with the
enactment of the Sound Recordings Act of 1971.' That Act granted
copyright protection to sound recordings for the first time but did not
grant owners of copyrights in sound recordings all the usual rights of
copyright owners. Instead they were granted only reproduction,
distribution, and derivative-work rights. Public performance was
excluded,41 giving the owners of sound recordings less than the full
inventory of exclusive rights guaranteed composers and publishers.
As a result, commercial radio broadcasters (and others) could play
42recorded music for the public, royalty-free.
For most music, two distinct copyrights exist: the copyright in the
composition-the musical work, and the copyright in the sound
recording. When a song is broadcast over the radio, only the owner of
the composition copyright is entitled to royalties. The distinction
between the right in the music itself and the right in a sound
recording of the music can be confusing at first. Some examples may
help to reduce the confusion.
Suppose Andrew composes a song and sings it to Tim, never
having written it down. Tim thinks it is catchy and sings it at Tim's
next performance at a club. Tim has not infringed Andrew's
performance right. Andrew has no copyright in the song because
there was no "fixation;" he did not write the song down or record it.
Andrew, having learned a little more about copyright law,
composes a second song, writes a simple score, and sings it to Tim.
Tim does the same thing he did with the first song. This time Tim has
infringed Andrew's performance right. A copyright now exists in the
song because it was "fixed" when Andrew wrote the score. Tim
infringed Andrew's exclusive right to perform the song publicly. It
makes no difference that what Tim copied was the sound of the music
rather than singing from the score.
Andrew composes a third song, records himself singing it and
makes a CD. A radio station plays the CD. Tim hears the radio
broadcast, likes the song and sings it at his next performance. Tim has
once again violated Andrew's performance right because he copied
40. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). This Act
was amended and made permanent by Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (codified as
amended in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 102 (1990)).
41. H.R. REP. 104-274 at 11 (Oct. 11, 1995).
42. Delchin, supra note 31, at 348 (citing Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102)).
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the music and performed it. Andrew has a copyright because he
"fixed" the song when he recorded it. On the other hand, Tim did not
copy the sound on the sound recording, so he has not infringed
Andrew's sound recording rights.
Tim gets hold of the score Andrew created, gets his band together
and they produce an enhanced version, with a drumset, bass, guitar, and
Tim's vocals. They make a CD and sell it. Tim and his fellow performers
have a right in the musical elements they added to Andrew's underlying
music. They produced a derivative work, and they are entitled to a
copyright in the value they added. They are not entitled, however, to rights
in Andrew's underlying music. In fact, by producing the new work based
on Andrew's original, they have infringed Andrew's derivative work right.
When Tim plays the CD for 100 of his classmates at a college reunion, he
has infringed Andrew's performance right in the original song. He has not,
however, infringed Andrew's sound recording rights in the CD Andrew
originally made, because he made no use of that CD.
If Tim is embarrassed by his group's derivative work, and makes
copies of Andrew's original CD and gives them out at the reunion,
Tim has violated Andrew's reproduction and distribution rights in the
sound recording, and has also violated Andrew's reproduction and
distribution rights in the song.
In 1995 Congress changed the legal equation by enacting the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act.43 This Act extended a
public performance right to digital recordings, but only when they are
obtained through an interactive service, which was thought more likely
than conventional one-to-many broadcasts to displace sales of physical
audio recordings. Established arrangements with radio and television
broadcasters were left intact.' So if Tim downloads an MP3 file of
Andrew's song and plays it at his reunion, he has infringed Andrew's
public performance right in the digital recording, as well as Andrew's
public performance right in the song itself.
These developments in music copyright law occurred largely
independently of broader reforms of copyright law in general.
Fundamental reform took place in 1976,"5 and again in 1988 when
43. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as various amendments to 17
U.S.C.).
44. Delchin, supra note 31, at 352-53.
45. In 1974 the Congress had created a National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") to develop recommendations on how to solve
problems raised by the impact of new technologies such as photocopying and computers
on the authorship, distribution, and use of copyrighted works. Pub. L. 93-573 (Dec. 31,
1974). The Commission's work shaped the content of the Copyright Act of 1976, although
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U.S. copyright law was brought into conformity with copyright
practices in other countries. Under the 1909 Act, federal copyright
arose when a work was published with the requisite copyright notice.
Unpublished works were protected by state common law. Publication
without a copyright notice placed the work in the public domain. The
1988 Act makes a copyright vest as soon as the work is fixed in a
tangible medium. The amended statute eliminates state common-law
copyright through express preemption.47 It greatly reduces the legal
significance of a copyright notice. The Act has been amended many
times since then to accommodate the law to changing technologies.'
C. Current Content
Under current law, copyright protection extends to "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.,
49
"Works of authorship" explicitly include "musical works, including
any accompanying words."' "Musical works"'" constitute a category
separate from "sound recordings, 5. "dramatic works, including any
the act was adopted before the Commission finished its work. Pub. L. 94-553 (1976)
(codified as 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). The legislative history of this act is contained in 94th
Cong., 1st sess., 1975, S. Rept. 473 [hereinafter "Senate Report"]; 94th Cong., 2d sess.,
1976, H. Rept. 1476 [hereinafter "House Report"]; and 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, H. Rept.
1733 [hereinafter "Conference Report"].
46. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (Oct.
31, 1988) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
48. See Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3960
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 119) (establishing compulsory licenses for satellite television
broadcasters); Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. .4237
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010) (imposing fees and technology requirements for
digital audio recording); Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114) (creating new
public performance rights and compulsory licenses for digital transmission of sound
recordings); No Electronic Theft Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)) (expanding scope of criminal copyright infringement to cover
noncommercial digital infringements); Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205) (prohibiting efforts to
defeat technological copy protection schemes); Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114) (modifying compulsory
license rates for small webcasters); Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273,. 116 Stat. 1758 (codified at 17 U.S.C §§ 110(2), 112)
(expanding copyright privileges for educational and library users to facilitate distance
learning over the Internet).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
50. Id. § 102(a)(2).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 102(a)(7). ("Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixation of a
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a
[29.3
NEW ARCHITECrURES FOR MUSIC
accompanying music"53  and from "motion pictures and other
audiovisual works.,
54
As the examples in the preceding section show, "When a
copyrighted song is recorded on a phonorecord, there are two
separate copyrights: one in the musical composition and the other in
the sound recording... The rights of a copyright in a sound recording
do not extend to the song itself, and vice versa."55 Moreover, the lyrics
are subject to an independent copyright as literary works.56 In
addition, performers and producers may enjoy independent
intellectual property protection for their trademarks57 and for
copyrighted images appearing on recorded media or packaging.58
The act defines six types of conduct for which copyright owners
exclusively have the privilege of doing or authorizing:
1. reproduction59
2. preparation of derivative works 6o
3. distribution of copies or phonorecords




6. performance through digital audio transmission
65
motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied."). Id. § 101. (The
physical object containing a "sound recording" is a "phonorecord," but the recorded music
itself is a "sound recording," but not a "phonorecord.").
53. Id. § 102(a)(3).
54. Id. § 102(a)(6).
55. Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
56. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that inclusion of lyrics on a CD containing music exceeded privilege conferred by
compulsory license and constituted infringement of copyright in lyrics).
57. See Firma Melodiya v. ZYX Music GmbH, 886 F. Supp. 1306, 1312 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (granting injunction against use of symbols and words on recorded music which
qualified as trademarks)
58. Jefferson Airplane v. Berkeley Systems, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 713, 716-17 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (registration of copyright for sound recording did not include illustration on album
covered; assuming that album cover would be eligible for separate copyright registration).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1) (2006).
60. Id. § 106(2).
61. Id. § 101 ("'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
'phonorecords' includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.").
62. Id. § 106(3).
63. Id. § 106(4) (excluding sound recordings from right).
64. Id. § 106(5).
20071
276 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [29.3
Music is treated differently under the statute depending on its
form. The reproduction and derivative-work rights extend to all
copyrighted works, including musical works, phonorecords and sound
recordings. The public-performance and public-display rights extend
to musical works but not to phonorecords and sound recordings.
Sound recordings alone are subject to the exclusive right of public
performance "by means of a digital audio transmission. '
Section 114 further defines and limits rights and privileges for the
broadcast of sound recordings,67 including a specific privilege for non-
commercial public broadcasting entities. 68 This section expressly
excludes sound recordings from the public-performance right under
section 106(4).69 The section limits the right to duplication of sound
recordings that recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording and
excludes from the derivative work right the ability of the holder to
make or duplicate another sound recording that "consists entirely of
an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds
imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording."70
Section 114 exempts from the specific performance right
performances through nonsubscription broadcast transmissions7 and
certain retransmissions. It also limits the duration of exclusive licenses
to interactive services,72 but it grants an exemption from the antitrust
laws for collective negotiation of licenses.7 This section provides for
compulsory arbitration of license terms for broadcast services, but not
for interactive services.74 Small webcasters enjoy specific compulsory
licensing rights under section 112."' Overall, section 114 limits the
unfettered exclusive right for public performance of sound recordings
to interactive digital audio services.76
65. Id. § 106(6).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 101 ("'Sound recordings': are works that result from the fixation of a series









76. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a) (prohibiting unauthorized copying of
commercially unreleased performance); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487-
88 (3d Cir. 2003) (reviewing history of performance right exclusion for sound recordings
and approving Copyright Office rule subjecting simultaneous webcasting of radio
broadcasts to performance right under Digital Audio Recording Act); United States v.
D. Response to Changes in Technology
Changes in technology have influenced the creation and content
of music for hundreds of years. Technologies for musical instruments
changed the style of performance and created a niche for composersS 77
as distinct from singers. Printing technology changed the way music
was disseminated, enlarging the possibilities of experiencing music for
listeners beyond live performances. 7' The development of the
phonograph record influenced audience choice in favor of singers like
Caruso, whose voice range matched the audio bandwidth capabilities
of early phonographs.79 The flexibility afforded by analog tape
recorders made it possible for artists to create and mix music distinct
from mere live recordings80 Later, digital technologies made possible
the processing of multiple recordings less expensive without
sacrificing quality.8' Jukeboxes permitted listeners to develop their
own playlists, concomitantly increasing the demand for vinyl
records." Radio broadcasts of music and Motorola's automobile
radio receivers made music enjoyment portable, 3 as did the later
development of transistorized portable radios' and later pre-
recorded cassette tapes and the Sony Walkman portable cassette
player. 5
Leapfrogging between playback and recording technologies
promised to increase markets for, and to increase the supply of,
Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 1999) (reviewing history of statutory
protection of sound recordings and affirming conviction for violation of anti-bootlegging
statute).
77. Musical instruments have been around for a long time. Instruments such as flutes,
drums, harps and predecessors of guitars and banjos have existed since biblical times.
There also has been constant innovation in instrument technology. The guitar was
introduced in 14th century Spain, the trombone in the 15th century, the clarinet in the late
1600s, the piano in 1709, the keyed trumpet in 1796, the tuba in 1835, and the saxophone
in 1846. In the twentieth century, electric guitars, drumsets for rock music, synthesizers,
and music generating computer software were added to the inventory. See also MARK
COLEMAN, PLAYBACK, 115-54 (Da Capo Press 2003) (chronicling evolution of disco DJ
manipulation of turntables into music synthesizers).
78. See Carroll, supra note 8, at 1408-09 (describing the effect of printing technology
on music).
79. COLEMAN, supra note 77, at 18 (chronicling the interaction between technology
and music, and exploring how technology influences the creation and, content of music as
well as its distribution).
80. Id. at 58.
81. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital-audio.
82. COLEMAN, supra note 77, at 42-46.
83. Id. at 82 (people listen to radio while they are doing something else).
84. Id. at 86.
85. Id. at 155-58.
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ic86music. This flexibility at times threatened the positions of
established stakeholders. 87 Vinyl records, a subsequently developed
recording media, killed big bands. Cassette tapes and the Walkman
killed vinyl records and the turntable. CDs and CD players killed
cassette tapes. Now downloadable music is killing the CD.'
At the onset of all these changes in technology, those already
established in the music industry usually initially deny the utility-or
at least the impact-of the new technologies, and then seek changes
in the law and in quasi legal arrangements to protect themselves from
competition enabled by the new technologies. 89 Rarely have the
established interests been the early adopters of the new ways of
making or disseminating music. Inevitably, however, the pressure of
consumer demand, which could be satisfied in new ways through new
technologies, has swept away the objections of the defenders of the
status quo-and often the objectors themselves.
Not only do the established rights holders seek to block
technologies making new competition possible, the new entrants and
new technology innovators also face daunting challenges in sorting
through the multiplicity of rights under existing law. One of the
difficulties in applying existing copyright law to music distribution
over the internet is in deciding what constitutes a reproduction, public
performance, or a distribution to the public. One innovative MP3 file
service, MP3.com, obtained licenses for public performances of music
streamed through its website. It obtained these public-performance
licenses from copyright collectives owning the right, only to be sued
for infringing the reproduction right, controlled by a different entity.'
86. Id. at xix-xxiii.
85. Id.
88. There continues to be, however, some demand for vinyl records, and perhaps also
for cassette tapes. This interest is fueled mostly by nostalgia and arguments that the
quality of a vinyl recording is somehow better than-or at least different from-recordings
on other media. The same will likely be true for CDs. Music recordings on most CDs are
less compressed than recordings in .mp3 files, and are therefore, technically, higher
quality recordings.
89. Litman, supra note 7, at 38 ("The current dominant forces in the music and
recording business may no longer need recording pressing plants, CD stamping plants,
warehouses and trucks to distribute music, but they have a huge stake in ensuring that
difital distributors be limited to those who used to rely [on those capital assets].").
90. Litman, supra note 7, at 18 (describing MP3.com experience (citing TEEVEE
Toons v. MP3.com, 134 F. Supp. 2d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
MP3.com, 109 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))); Zeb G. Schorr, The Future of Online
Music: Balancing the Interests of Labels, Artists, and the Public, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
67, 77 (2003) (describing MP3.com's requirement that subscribers demonstrate ownership
of purchased CD).
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According to rights holders, any dissemination of music through the
Internet, whether by posting on a website, sending it by email, or
including it in a file-sharing index, potentially infringes the
reproduction, public-distribution, and public display/performance
rights. 9 Some rights holders have taken the position that making a
link to copyrighted material available on a website also infringes the
reproduction, public-distribution, and public performance/display
rights, because a visitor to the website can easily make a copy of the
linked music file by clicking on the link.' Music copyright also
presents difficulties for consumers and artists who want to build on
existing music. "Today, in short, everything is protected by copyright
and it is almost impossible to figure out whom to ask for
permission."
E. Supreme Court Grokster Decision
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,9" the Supreme
Court of the United States, reversing the Ninth Circuit, held that
distributors of free software that permitted sharing of music files
through peer-to-peer networks were liable for copyright infringement
by users of the software because they distributed the software "with
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement." 95
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
shown little sympathy for the position of the Grokster plaintiffs:
From the advent of the player piano, every new means of
reproducing sound has struck a dissonant chord with musical
copyright owners, often resulting in federal litigation.
91. Litman, supra note 7, at 19; Recording Industry Sues XM Satellite Radio, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 2006 at p. C7 (reporting on RIAA suit in the Southern District of New
York claiming damages for the downloading of digital radio broadcast songs into a device
that can store up to 50 hours of music for a monthly fee; acknowledging that XM radio
already paid for public performance license fees).
92. Litman, supra note 7, at 20 (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th
Cir. 2002), withdrawn in 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)); Intellectual Reserve v. Utah
Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999)). Prof. Litman also notes that the
recording industry apparently takes the position that mere possession of an infringing file
constitutes infringement. Id.; supra notes 78-79.
93. Litman, supra note 7, at 22.
94. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
95. Id. at 918.
96. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th
Cir. 2004), rev'd 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old
markets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose works
are sold through well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet,
history has shown that time and market forces often provide
equilibrium in balancing interests, whether the new technology be a
player piano, a copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal
computer, a karaoke machine, or an MP3 player. Thus, it is prudent
for courts to exercise caution before restructuring liability theories
for the purpose of addressing specific market abuses, despite their
apparent present magnitude.
The court of appeals evaluated the claim against Grokster under
the standard of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.98
In Sony, the Supreme Court held that the sale of video recorders
could not give rise to contributory copyright infringement liability
even though the defendant knew the machines were being used to
commit infringement. It was sufficient to defeat a claim of
contributory copyright infringement if the defendant showed that the
product was "capable" of "substantial" or "commercially significant"
non-infringing uses. Because Sony's Betamax video recorder was
capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses, constructive
knowledge of the infringing activity could not be imputed from the
fact that Sony knew the recorders, as a general matter, could be used
for infringement.'
The Ninth Circuit construed Sony as requiring only that the
accused product be capable of substantial non-infringing uses and,
thus, evidence of the percentages of infringing versus non-infringing
uses was immaterial.'0° Grokster's evidence met this standard. The
court also found insufficient evidence that the defendants had specific
knowledge of infringing activity at the time of their alleged
contribution to it and failed to take appropriate action. It therefore
affirmed summary judgment for Grokster on the count of
contributory infringement. 101
As to vicarious infringement," the court found insufficient
evidence that the defendants had the right and ability to control the
97. Id. at 1167.
98. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ("Sony-Betamax").
99. Id.
100. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162.
101. Id. at 1162-63.
102. "One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct
infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while
declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.... [T]he lines between direct infringement,
contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn." 545 U.S. at 930-31
& n.9.
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direct infringers. The defendants were more like "landlords" than
"dance hall operators," and thus could not be liable for vicarious
infringement. °3
The Supreme Court reversed. Central to its analysis was the fact
that "[t]he record is replete with evidence that from the moment
Grokster and StreamCast (the co-defendant) began to distribute their
free software, each one clearly voiced the objective that recipients use
it to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to
encourage infringement."'°4
The Court recognized that the interpretation of copyright law
requires striking a balance between providing appropriate incentives
for creation of music and inhibiting technological innovation. 5
The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, however,
a powerful one, given the number of infringing downloads that
occur every day using StreamCast's and Grokster's software. When
a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement,
it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work
effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative
being to go against the distributor of the copying device for
secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious
infringement. "
Declining to be drawn into the controversy over how the
"capable of substantial non-infringing uses" standard of Sony should
be quantified according to percentages of infringing versus non-
infringing uses, the Court side-stepped application of the doctrines of
contributory or vicarious infringement and instead relied on an
"inducement" theory.
1 7
The rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early
cases is no different today. Evidence of active steps . . . taken to
encourage direct infringement, such as advertising an infringing use
or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an
affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a
showing that infringement was encouraged overcomes the law's
reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a
commercial product suitable for some lawful use.
Because the evidence showed active efforts by the defendants to
promote use of the software to reproduce copyrighted music files
without permission of the rights holder, the Court reversed the Ninth
103. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164.
104. Grokster, 525 U.S. 923-24.
105. Id. at 928.
106. Id. at 929-30.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 936 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Circuit and held that the evidence presented triable issues of fact on
the liability of the defendants for inducing copyright infringement.
Grokster is important, not only because it extends liability to
software developers, but also because it extends the scope of liability
for music file sharing beyond those actually sharing files. Accordingly,
it invites careful consideration of the circumstances under which file
sharing should be treated as infringement. If copyright law were to
provide a "safe harbor" within which file sharing is legitimate,
developers of software and network infrastructures who facilitate that
type of file sharing could escape liability.
Originally intended and constitutionally justified as a tool to
reduce transaction costs that might impede music creation, copyright
law has grown into a thicket of thorns that threatens creators of new
music and distributors of old music with new transaction costs.
Market participants continue to worry about free-riding, but they also
worry about traps that may await them if they are accused of
infringing some obscure right in a sound or a musical idea that may be
claimed by someone else.
IV. The Market for Music
Total worldwide recorded music sales in 2005 were $21 billion,
down about 3% from the previous year. More than 100,000 album
titles were released worldwide in 2004, while singles sales dominated
the digital market." Digital sales revenues tripled in 2005, from $400
million to $1.1 billion, while sales of physical formats fell by 6.7% in
value, and 8% in units." ° Performance rights revenues totaled nearly
$500 million in 2004, up 19% over the last five years, reflecting
additional licensing income from webcasting. 1'
The demand for recorded music in CD form is declining.12 CD
sales dropped an average of 7% per year since 2000.113 It is unlikely
that the demand for the music contained on CDs is declining. Rather,
demand is increasingly being satisfied by downloading. By one
109. IFPI Fact Sheet: RIN 2005, http://www.ifpi.org/content/sectionnews/
20050802a.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
110. IFPI.org, Digital formats continue to drive the global music market (Mar. 31,
2006), http://www.ifpi.org/content/section-news/20060331a.html.
111. IFPI.org, IFPI releases definitive statistics on global market for recording music -
Press Summary: RIN 2005 (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.ifpi.org/content/sectionnews/
20050802.html.
112. Princeton Study, supra note 25, at 23 (noting decline from 1999-2002, after being
flat for five years before that).
113. Id. at 53.
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estimate, one billion songs were downloaded each week in 2004.114
Conclusions differ on whether downloading is responsible for
declining CD sales. The "sampling" effect might increase CD sales,
just as advertising does. A "substitution" effect would diminish
sales. "5 MP3s and CDs are not perfect substitutes because CD
packages often include photographs and other artwork, lyrics and
notes."6 Apple iTunes, other commercial sources for MP3 files, and
artists are closing this gap, however, by making artwork available on
their websites.
One study found that, for the top 35 popular music artists,"7
income from live performances exceeded income from record sales by
a ratio of 7.5 to 1, and royalties from publishing music was slightly less
than income from recordings. 118 But this statistic is misleading. In
2003, the total value of sales of recorded music was $11.8 billion,
while the total value of concert ticket sales was $2.1 billion. Most of
the revenue from recorded music sales goes to intermediaries, not tothe 119120
the artists."9 The top 1% of artists took 56% of concert revenue.
The authors of the Princeton Study observe that "popular music
concerts are a slow productivity growth sector."'' In other words,
changes in technology have not affected the production function for
musical performances, which always have been defined by high fixed
costs and near-zero marginal costs. On the other hand, changes in
technology making recorded music more widely available at lower
cost may have increased the demand for live performances because of
the network effects considered more fully in § B.3 below.
Music publishing revenues in the United States were about $2
billion in 2001, with $1 billion attributable to performances. 22 For
example, performance rights for the song "Happy Birthday" are
estimated to earn $2 million per year."
Musicians now have many more choices for creating music,
recording it, and distributing it. They also have new ways to draw




117. Id.at 2 (defining popular music to include rock, jazz, blues and rap).
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id. at 19.
121. Id. at 21.
122. Id. at 43.
123. Bonneville International Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487 n.1 (3d Cir. 2003).
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possibilities and face new choices. New choices impact costs, prices
and revenue streams. Copyright law's role in this transformed
marketplace can encourage creativity or it can discourage it. Its ideal
role should be determined by a careful assessment of the economic
effect of new technologies for creation, search, distribution, and
performance.
In any market, supply functions and demand functions determine
how much of a good is supplied and consumed, as a function of price
and other relevant variables. Supply and demand functions must be
estimated separately for different markets. For example, the supply
function for mass-marketed big-label music is markedly different than
the supply function for Independent ("Indie")'2" music. The demand
function, however, is largely the same because both types of producer
span a broad range of genres. The supply and demand functions are
different for recorded, as opposed to live, music. Such complete
supply and demand functions could be manipulated mathematically,
to say things like: "Based on these assumptions about creator and
consumer behavior, this is how the free riding risk has been changed
by this particular technology; here's why the following change in
copyright law will not undercut production of music," and so on.
This section does not specify complete supply and demand
functions. Instead, it identifies the variables that affect any plausible
supply or demand functions, suggests the effects that new music"
technologies are likely to have on the value of the variables, and then
estimates the direction and rough magnitude of the technology's
aggregate effects on the supply of and demand for music. In other
words, it sketches the structure of the supply and demand functions.
A following article will suggest equations that can be manipulated to
estimate new equilibria
A. Supply
This section begins by explaining the structure of the supply side
of the popular music industry, proceeds to explore how technology
has changed the cost of performing the main functions, and concludes
by sketching a supply function.
Four major components of the supply chain for music exist.
Artists include songwriters and performers often working together in
groups (bands) with longevity measured from months to years. A
handful, such as Coldplay, are well known. Millions are unknown;
124. "Indie" refers both to smaller record labels, often opertating on a financial
shoestring, as well as to undiscovered musicians.
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nearly every town has scores of (mostly) young people who consider
themselves professional musicians. The boundary between amateur
and professional is indistinct because most undiscovered musicians
make their livings primarily by working at jobs outside the music
industry.
Producers, comprising the second component, arrange live
performances and oversee the process of studio recording. When
capital costs for recording were high, economies of scale resulted in
producer concentration in both the recorded- and live-music
categories. Major record labels, with their market share shown in
parentheses, include Universal (25.5%), Sony BMG (21.5%), EMI
(13.4%), and Warner (11.3%). Indie labels account for 28.4% of the
market.'25 "Label" is a confusing term. It actually refers to two
distinct functions in the producer category. Its most precise meaning
is as a brand. In this sense, the "major labels" actually are music
conglomerates, each producing and selling music under a multiplicity
of labels. 126 For example, Warner owns the Elektra and Atlantic
labels; Sony/BMG owns the Columbia, Arista, RCA Records and
Epic labels. 127 At the low end of the market, the distinction between a
label and the name of a band is ambiguous. Performers wishing to
break into the market often simply adopt one or more names for their
band(s) and more or less simultaneously adopt one or more names
for their label."' Usually label names are associated with the process
of recording and marketing CDs.'
29
125. IFPI.org, IFPI releases definitive statistics on global market for recording music -
Press Summary: RIN 2005 (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.ifpi.org/content/sectionnews/
20050802.html.
126. See generally, DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE
Music BUSINESS 64 (Simon & Schuster, 5th ed. 2003).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g. Ouchosparks, http://www.ouchosparks.com/,http://www.myspace.com/
ouchosparks (Chicago group offering CD and digital sales through the Web); Dick Prall,
www.dickprall.com, http://www.myspace.com/dickprall (performing under his own name
and under band-names "Dick Prall Band," and "Starch Martins," offering live
performance schedules and CDs and digital singles for sale); Hijack the Disco,
www.hijackthedisco.com (an Oakland Group, which emphasizes live performances);
Andreas Kapsalis Trio, http://www.andreaskapsalis.com,http://www.myspace.com/
andreaskapsalistrio (Chicago group offering performance schedules and downloads
through the Internet); Jamie Gallagher, www.myspace.com/jamiegallagher (performing as
part of Ouchosparks and Andreas Kapsalis Trio); Darren Garvey,
http://www.myspace.com//darrengarvey.com (performing as a member of several bands,
including Andreas Kapalis Trio).
129. See Patrick Sisson, Chicago's Record Labels, CENTERSTAGE, Apr. 1, 2004,
http://centerstage.net/music/articles/chicago-record-labels.html (profiling 19 record labels
in Chicago).
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Concentration in that part of the industry that promotes live
music concerts is growing. Live Nation, Inc., the largest U.S.
promoter of live music concerts acquired HOB ("House of Blues")
another larger live-concert promoter, in mid-2006. Live Nation itself
was spun off from Clear Channel Communications, the country's
largest owner of radio stations, which bought it from SFX
Entertainment, then the largest U.S. concert promoter and venue
owner, in 2000. Nevertheless, in every community, small, free-lance
promoters help music groups and venues get together.
Distributors (including both distributors of recorded music and
concert promoters), making up the third component, are wholesalers,
responsible for getting finished product from the producers to the
retailers. Distributors offer value in the form of their established
relationships with retailers and their capacity to manage inventory. At
the high end of the market, the production and distribution activities
are vertically integrated. At the low end of the market, they are not.
Retailers, (including retail sellers of recorded music and venues
for live performances) representing the fourth component, include
stores such as Tower Records, and Borders Books, in which physical
product is sold, online retailers of physical product such as CDBaby,
Amazon.com, and online merchants for digital music, such as Apple
iTunes.
Fisher estimates that out of the price of a CD, a little over a third
goes to the retailer, and a little less than 10% to the distributor, with
the remaining 55% or so to the record label. For the record labels,
out of their 55%, 17% goes to overhead, 14% to marketing, about
6% to manufacturing, 14% to artist royalties and 2% to profit. The
artist royalty figure includes recovery of advances to artists and losses
for most works."3
According to one commentator, working from industry data,
only 10% of major-label albums released annually are profitable,
based on advances to artists of $250,000, $250,000-$500,000 in
marketing costs for each album, manufacturing and shipping costs of
$2.25 per album, record-company margins of $7.50-$11.50 per album
at wholesale, and net profit of $5.75 per album. The breakeven is
90,000 sales, and only 16% reach this level. 3'
130. William W. Fisher III, PROMISE TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004), 260 (reviewing various estimates, which differ in
detail but basically agree on the rough proportions of the revenue split).
131. See Brett J. Miller, The War Against Free Music: How the RIAA Should Stop
Worrying and Learn to Love the MP3, 82 U.DET.MERCY L.REV. 303 (2005) (arguing that
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The premise for copyright law is that all of these market
participants need to be protected against "free-riding." The free-
riding risk is higher for recorded music than for live concerts. 132 It also
is higher for creators of music, compared with producers, distributors
and retailers, although these downstream participants may have to
compete with an alternative supply channel in which the initial costs
for product are lower. Accordingly, it is appropriate to focus the
economic analysis of free riding on the creation and recording
activities. For convenience, the article refers to a person getting a free
ride as a "pirate," though it ultimately concludes that some kinds of
copying and distribution are desirable and should not be illegal.
The sections below evaluate the elements of the cost structures
for both creator and pirate, for live performances, for the traditional
recording-studio approach and for the newer web-enabled "Indie"
approach. The sections include cost functions and sketch supply
functions, based on the assumptions developed.
1. Products and Revenue Streams
The estimation of supply functions for music must consider four
different forms in which music can be delivered: (1) live
performances, (2) CDs, (3) MP3 files delivered via CD or via the
Internet, (4) broadcast music played on terrestrial or satellite radio or
streamed through the Internet. As the description of the forms
suggests, the supply functions also may need to take into account nine
different distribution channels: (1) physical exchange of CDs, (2) live
performances, (3) file downloading through specialized music sales
services on the Internet, such as Rhapsody and iTunes, (4) peer-to-
peer file sharing networks, (5) direct e-commerce sales of recorded
music and live-performance tickets through the Internet by the artist
or his producers, (6) conventional radio broadcasting, (7) satellite
radio broadcasting, (8) Web broadcasting, and (9) "pod casting."
Any economic analysis of music production must recognize that
many co-products, joint-products, complementary products, and
substitute products exist in music production.
file sharing represents consumer preferences in the face of "years of foisting shoddy bands
and overpriced albums on the public" by the recording industry).
132. But see 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (granting exclusive rights for public performances and
making it an infringement to make an unauthorized recording of a public musical
performance); Susan M. Deas, Jazzing Up the Copyright Act? Resolving the Uncertainties
of the United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 567 (1998)
(reviewing history and interpretation of Anti-Bootlegging law).
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"Co-product" and "joint-product" signify multiple products that
are produced from the same capital assets and, often, from the same
production process. In farming, chickens can produce eggs and fried
chicken; cows can produce milk and steaks, though neither can do so
at the same time. Raw milk can produce both butter and skimmed
milk. All thermal engines produce both power and heat (that is how
most cars are heated, with otherwise waste heat from the engine).
Complementary products are a bit different. They may be
produced from different production processes and different
producers, but they are used together: peanut butter, jelly, and bread;
(old-fashioned) razors and razor blades; iPods and iTunes; laser
printers and laser cartridges, microphones and recorders.
Substitute products, as the phrase suggests, are products either of
which may satisfy demand. One may eat either a peanut-butter-and-
jelly sandwich or a grilled cheese sandwich, but probably not both.
One may listen to an authorized recording of a song or a pirated
version.
In the music industry there are a multitude of co-products and
complementary products. The same song can be performed publicly,
recorded, or published. The same singer can sing one song or another
of his own creation. The same song can be performed live, recorded,
or distributed on sheet music. The same performance can be
delivered live, on a music-video DVD, through a television
performance, or through a downloadable music video file.3 3 Fans of
particular performers like to consume not only the live concerts and
the CDs, but also to download the music, wear T-shirts, buy books
about the performer, and, sometimes, play sheet music representing
the performers' songs.
These related products can be understood as multiple
distribution channels for the same product. They can be understood
as ways to promote a particular member of the product family. But
they are also mostly co-products (except for the T-shirts and books),
in that they are produced from the same capital assets.
Their existence is significant for economic analysis because the
fixed costs for one member of the product family can be spread over
133. Most recorded music, however, is produced through separate processes, in which
different parts of a musical composition are recorded separately and then "mixed" to
achieve the desired effect. To a substantial degree, recorded music and music performed
before a live audience are separate products with distinct inputs, sharing only the same
composition or musical idea. They are as different as a motion picture is from a stage
production. Exceptions exist, however. Frank Zappa was notable for mixing tracks
recorded from live concerts rather than producing tracks in a studio.
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multiple products, and because their multiplicity enables different
business models. One performer may sell admission to the
performances and give away CDs to build audiences; another may
offer free admission to the performances to build the market for CDs.
Increasingly the availability of free music over the Internet builds
visibility and reputation, enabling sales of other products that
otherwise would not occur.
Substitute products exist in the form of pirated recordings and of
multiple artists performing similar songs. But often there is room for
debate whether something is a substitute product or a complementary
product. Does a consumer choose between a recording and a live
performance, or does exposure to the recorded music induce her to
go to a concert? Most performers think that performances and
recorded music are complementary products-a given performer can
perform or record the same song, and often does both. Consumers
often go to see a live performance because they have heard the
artist's recorded music.
Other products clearly are complementary. As artists become
more popular, and when the audience enjoys a particular
performance, sales of merchandise-tangible products such as
posters, tee shirts and coffee mugs with the artists' name or logo on
them-can provide a significant revenue contribution. Truly famous
artists can earn large amounts of additional income by endorsing non-
music products in print and electronic advertisements.
This and following sections crystallize the different permutations
that exist in the real world and associates them with different business
models likely to be used by different types of performers at different
stages in their careers.
All of these revenue streams are associated with different
outputs or differentiated products of the same inputs-bundles of
physical, human, and organizational capital representing the artists
and associated producers. To some extent, the same performer costs
are shared by all the revenue streams. These market participants can
choose which kind of product to emphasize, using essentially the
same human, physical and organizational capital.1" On the other hand
capital for producers, distributors and retailers is specialized. The
capital embedded in a producer of recorded music cannot easily be
134. This is true only to some extent. The costs and activities associated with a tour
involving multiple performances obviously are different from the costs and activities
associated with recording a single in the studio. Musician preferences and relative talents
also matter in electing between live performances and studio recording. Some songwriters
can produce a respectable song in a studio but are entirely incapable of performing live.
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adapted to produce concerts, nor can a CD distributor's capital be
used easily to promote live-music performance. The capital
embedded in a live-performance venue cannot easily be used to retail
a large number of CDs. Performers and intermediaries, however,
usually have some monopoly power in multiple markets and thus can
determine relative prices, "5 and thus "steer" consumers to the
distribution channel the performers and their intermediaries prefer.
2. Inputs and Factors of Production and Their Costs
Digital, small-computer, and Internet technologies have had a
profound effect on almost every aspect of popular music. 36 The
technologies have changed the way music is created, the way it is
produced, promoted, and distributed. Technology has had a greater
impact on the supply functions for recorded music than on those for
live music performances. Nevertheless, by reducing the costs of
advertising, marketing, and distribution enormously, it has changed
the economics of the supply of live music as well as of the supply of
recorded music.
Understanding the economics of the supply of music requires
consideration of human, physical and organizational capital, which
comprise the principal inputs for music creation and production.
a. Human Capital
Human capital is most closely associated with creative activity,
while physical and organizational capital (musical instruments aside)
is more closely associated with production and distribution activities.
Musical works start in with a songwriter getting an idea for a
song. Some songwriters start with the lyrics and build melody, chord
progressions and rhythm around them. Others start with a rhythmic
idea and build out from there, sometimes authoring the lyrics last.
Others start with interesting chord progressions, and so on. Many
rock bands do not engage in conventional songwriting in the sense of
writing out a complete score. Instead, they improvise through an
unstructured jam session as a group. As they play, they take parts that
they like and form them into more structured songs, although they
may play them a bit differently every time.
135. See Princeton Study, supra note 25, . at 24 (offering pricing equation based on
cross-elasticities of demand).
136. As Section IV(B) argues, the same technologies also have profoundly changed
the way music is enjoyed.
Music has to be played or sung to be consumed. Not every
songwriter is a good singer or guitar or keyboard player. Few are
good drummers. Some good singers and guitar and keyboard players
are good composers, but many are not. Accordingly the songwriting
function and the performing function often are performed separately,
quite separately in the country music part of the industry, less
separately in the Indie rock part of the industry.37
Producers bring the necessary factors of production together,
including finance, using their own embedded human capital. Music
industry producers often have significant creative talent and supervise
rehearsals and recording sessions. Not only do these types of
producers need to be creative musically, they also must be
knowledgeable about acoustic engineering and the technologies of
recording and manipulation of digital audio files.
Recording a song in a studio requires significantly different
human capital, compared with public performances. Any acceptable
public performance involves singing and playing the accompaniment
for a song from the beginning to the end, straight through without
interruptions or retakes. It also involves stage presence: physical
appearance, athletic moves, and humorous asides between songs.
Recording in a studio avoids the visual features of a live performance.
Musicians may attend a recording session unshaven, in dirty T-shirts,
barefooted or with mismatched socks. Charisma is unimportant.
Moreover, for most musicians and producers, studio recording is
nothing but breaks, retakes, and repetition. In a studio, a performer
need not have in mind more than one phrase or section of a musical
work. Once that portion of the work has been recorded to the
satisfaction of the producer and the performers, they move on to
another section. The sections need not be recorded in order, and
repeating sections of lyrics or music can simply be cut and pasted into
any position where they are needed.
Moreover, it is unnecessary for all of the performers involved in
a particular song to be in the studio at the same time. It is common to
have the singer present only for one session, the drummer present for
another session, the bass guitarist for another, and so on. Many group
members, however, like to be present, even when they themselves are
not performing, so they can influence the assembly of their song.
These possibilities have a profound impact on the creative
process. A composer can come to a producer with some lyrics, a basic
137. See GEOFFREY P. HULL, THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 77-78 (2d ed. 2004)
(contrasting songwriting models in rock and country segments of music industry).
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musical idea of structure, melody and chords and rhythm. The
producer and/or composer then can recruit performers to contribute
to the work-a singer, a drummer, a bass guitarist, and electric guitar
player, an acoustic guitar player, and perhaps a trumpet player and a
pianist. Or, the same musician can sing and play all the instruments,
separately recording each track.
The singer produces a "scratch track" with some accompaniment.
The drummer comes in, and he and the producer and composer try
out different rhythms and percussion effects-bass drum, tom, snares,
top-hat, cymbals, for different parts of the song, typically recording
the drum track in segments of four to eight measures, which will be
put together later. The drummer leaves, after a four or five hour
recording session for one song, and the result is the drum track, which
is maintained separately on the computers and hard drives used for
recording.
The process is repeated for a bass track, for an electric guitar
track, and so one. As each track is recorded, the main performer (and
perhaps other members of the group) interacts intensively with the
others present, collaborating creatively. Because the performance
occurs in short takes, everyone can focus on particular sections of the
music rather than having to be in the position to perform a piece from
beginning to end. It is more like a careful rehearsal process than a
public performance.
Once all the necessary tracks have been recorded, the producer,
or a separate sound engineer operating under the producer's
direction, mixes the tracks to emphasize different tracks at different
points in the musical work. At this point, mistakes such as off-pitch
notes and poorly timed attacks or releases 138 can be fixed by the
software. This also is an intrinsically creative process, inseparable
from the composition and performance steps.
At these recording sessions whoever controls the creative
character of the work makes significant artistic judgments. For
example, a song writer, listening to the vocals, lead guitar and
percussion tracks together may try out different kinds of bass
accompaniment, some of which can be computer generated or
performed in real time by the requisite instrumentalist. In this fashion
the creativity of song writing and arranging is integrated seamlessly
with the work of performing, recording, mixing, and production.
138. An attack is the commencement of the sound representing a musical note. A
release is the termination of the same sound.
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The savings in human capital resulting from this method of
production can be significant, because each performer can be
scheduled for a time when his or her opportunity costs are lowest.
Moreover, much less rehearsal time is required for all the performers
because they need never have practiced their part in a work so that it
can be performed more or less flawlessly. Also, recording the
performers separately means that each performer need take time only
to correct his or her own mistakes and not wait around or have to do
a retake because someone else has made a mistake.
Recording on separate tracks has been common for years. What
is new is desktop computing power and software for a few hundred
dollars that makes the collection, editing and integration of short
musical passages easy. These new tools also significant reduce the
"granularity" with which tracks can be manipulated. Short musical
phrases are easy to keep track of and to find.
New technologies have varying effects on different aspects of
human capital involved in producing music, significantly changing the
way recorded music is put together, and creating possibilities for
musicians of modest talent to put together acceptable recorded
musical works. Voice quality, and creativity with respect to lyrics,
melody, rhythm, and chord progressions, are a combination of innate
talent and training and experience. PC software and websites exists
that facilitate-and thereby reduce the time commitment and cost-
for ear training, for becoming proficient on an instrument, and for
songwriting.139 Technology long has expanded the nature of musical
instruments available, with the advent of electric guitars in the 1940s
and the advent of the synthesizer in the 1960s. Desktop digital
recording hardware and software are many new music instruments.
Their existence increases the options available to musicians.
Not only has the equipment itself become cheaper by a couple of
orders of magnitude, it has become easier to use. Significant musical
skill is a prerequisite; it always has been. But much of the tedium of
rewinding audio tapes, and physically cutting and splicing tape has
been completely eliminated. Digital software makes it possible to go
directly to a desired part of a recorded track. Analog devices permit
only sequential access; the entire tape must be run through the heads
until the desired passage is reached. Tape counters make it possible to
note the beginning of each take, but the audio engineer must write
down the counter reading for each passage he may want to retrieve
139. See, e.g. Berklee Music web site, http://www.berkleemusic.com (offering online,
interactive, courses for musicians).
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later. It probably takes 10 seconds to write down a counter reading,
and another 20 seconds to reach the beginning of a phrase by
rewinding or fast forwarding the tape. Suppose five musicians are
recording contributions on separate tracks for a three-verse, three-
chorus song lasting three minutes in total. Each musician requires six
takes on average to get the desired performance for each section.
That results in 180 separate sections on tape. That results in 90
minutes of time just to access parts of the recording, time that is
completely eliminated with the use of digital recording and editing
software. If all the members of a musical group are present during the
process, 450 minutes of human opportunity cost are saved by digital
PC technology as compared with older technology.
140
Someone with a few dozen hours of training can produce
acceptable quality recorded music, at least if she has reasonable levels
of talent. It is surely within the reach of almost any serious musician
with ordinary levels of computer competence to acquire the skills
necessary to use all the features of mixing and dubbing hardware and
software. Formal training is unnecessary for most users; they can
learn on their own, just as they learn to use word processing or photo
editing software. Others can obtain formal training on Pro Tools
recording equipment for $1,000 for about 20 contact hours classroom
and lab training.1 More traditional resident training for audio
engineers costs on the order of $18,000.42
In sum, technology has reduced the amount of human capital to
make recorded music, especially over the first few years of the 21st
Century, even as changes in wage rates for "day jobs" have also
increased, making opportunity costs even more important.
b. Physical Capital
New technologies affect the physical capital necessary to produce
recorded music more profoundly than the physical capital relevant to
live performances. In both areas, however, capital costs continue to
plummet, reducing the overall fixed cost burdens of music creators.
140. There is no inherent reason that newer technologies make it less necessary for all
musicians to be present during a recording session. It was just as feasible using multi-track
analog recording technology of 1990 to record individual musicians separately on separate
tracks, although the number of available tracks was less than with digital technology.
141. Soundthinking, www.soundthinking.com/digiology.pdf (last visited April 12,
2007) (advertising a cost of $1000 for both levels of training, each having four classes of
2.5 hours).
142. Audiocareer, http://www.audiocareer.com/tuition.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007)
(advertising $18,225 tuition, plus $75 registration, for two 5 week sessions).
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Historically, the development and low cost availability of
amplification and loudspeaker systems significantly changed the
possibilities for music performances. These technological advances
increased the possible scale of a performance. Without sound
amplification, the maximum audience size was in the hundreds. With
amplification, it is in the tens of thousands, constrained not by the
reach of the sound but by the size of possible arenas. Advances in
audio technology over the 20th Century have reduced the cost of
sound systems by an order of magnitude or more. In addition,
advances in video technology, more recent in their low cost
availability, have nudged the feasible scale of performances higher.
Now, one can see a much-greater than life-sized image of performers
on a large screen and get greater satisfaction from watching a live
performance at a considerable distance than would be possible if one
could barely see the musicians or had to use binoculars to see them.
Live performances have high fixed costs and very low marginal
costs. But only a small fraction of the fixed costs is in capital goods for
sound amplification. Most of the costs involve facility rental and
advertising and promotion. For a large scale performance, it costs
tens of thousands of dollars to rent an arena and to pay all the
personnel who take tickets, run the sound, video and light systems,
and provide security. The added cost for each additional member of
the audience is close to zero. Accordingly, the impact of technology
on the physical capital costs for live performances is modest.
The impact of technology on the costs of physical capital for
recorded music is much greater. Capital equipment required for
studio recording includes high-quality microphones, pre-amplifiers
for each microphone, sound-proof isolation rooms, hardware or
software for controlling levels and frequency response of each input
channel, recording hardware and software, mixing software and CD
duplication hardware.
The preceding section on human capital provided an overview of
the recording process. Management of this process requires a means
to play back material already recorded so that a performer can hear it
while he performs to create an additional track. It requires a means to
record the new track as it is playing back the existing ones-a process
known as "overdubbing," and to combine each new track with
existing ones. It requires a means to control volume levels of each
track separately, to introduce fades, and to cut and paste portions of
tracks according to a finely grained time track.
The process of recording through different channels onto
different tracks permits the subsequent process of mastering, which
20071 NEW ARCHITECTURES FOR MUSIC
296 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. [29.3
adjusts volume, tonal range, and sometimes tempo and pitch of the
different sounds to get a pleasing result, and to permit a consumer to
move from one song to another in a single album without hearing
distracting changes in tone or volume. State-of-the-art software
permits pitch adjustment and stretching or condensing the length of a
segment without changing pitch.
In 1990, the audio equipment in a recording studio cost on the
order of $100,000.' Its cost and size made it very unlikely that a
musician would have his own equipment. The only practical means
for recording and mixing a song or an album was to spend hours in
the recording studio, at a typical 1990 cost of $75 to $100 per hour.
In 2005, the possibilities have increased greatly and the cost has
been reduced even more. Even an amateur musician can afford
studio-grade recording and mixing equipment. Microphones are
available for a hundred dollars-a few hundred for specialized mikes
for recording percussion instruments- and a few hundred dollars
buys software for Wintel or Apple Macintosh computers that does
everything in terms of mixing and overdubbing that used to require
the highest end studio equipment. Recording and mastering
equipment is available at prices within the reach of middle class
musicians. Moreover, the prices are falling. The "cadillac," ProTools
HD Accel TDM Systems have an 80% market share and run on
Windows and Apple Power Macs. A high-end ProTools system lists
for $14,000.14 A new Mac Pro with two monitors lists for $4,500. 14
Packages are available for $20,000146 to $35,000.147 More and more
producers are passing up ProTools and using software such as Adobe
Audition (formerly CoolEdit Pro), which sells for $299 and, unlike
143. See Sara Filzen, The History of Cuca Records, 1959-1973: A Case Study of an
Independent Record Company, "Epilogue" (1998), http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-
bin/FilznHCuca/FilznHCuca-idx?type=HTML&rgn=DIV1&byte=48581&ql=&q2=&q3=
(reporting value of recording studio equipment as $70,000 in 1973). Basic recording
technology did not change much between 1973 and 1990, and the rate of inflation was on
the order of 5% annually.
144. List price for Pro Tools HD 3 Accel system bundle $13,995. See
www.digidesign.com/support/docs for documentation on hardware and software for digital
recording, and www.digidesign.com/index.cfm?navid=84&langid=100&itemid=4888 for
price (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
145. List price for Power Mac G5 dual 2.7 GHz w/250 GM hard drive, no monitor:
$2,499; list price for Apple 23 inch display: $999. www.apple.com (last visited June 16,
2005).
146. $23,500 for "entry level" ProTools HD1 package.
www.soundthinking.com/hdl system.htm (last visited 16 June 2005).
147. Sound Thinking: Pre-configured pro tools systems,
www.soundthinking.com/hd3_system.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
ProTools, does not require proprietary add-ons. It runs on generic
PCs with fast processors and hard disks of 700 MB or more.
Acoustica's Mixcraft is another option.148 Audacity, with basic
recording and mixing features, is available for free.'49
The same technological advances are, of course, available to
high-end recording studios. As their capital costs have declined so
have hourly rates for studio recording time. Now, an Indie musician
can spend up to a hundred hours in a studio recording an album for
less than $10,000 total studio cost, compared to ten times that much a
decade earlier.
High-quality recording studios in big cities charge $40 to $85 per
hour for recording time, and $95 per hour for mastering.'50 Bargain
studios offer specials, such as a 3 to 4 song demo for a grand total of
about $1,100,' and have lower hourly rates, as low as $30 per hour.
52
Studio Ballistico in Chicago 53 charges $50 per hour for everything. Its
proprietor is a talented musician who provides significant creative
input if a customer desired.
c. Organizational Capital
Most of the fixed costs of producing and selling popular music,
whether in recorded or live form, involve organizational capital. The
share of revenue that flows to composers and performers rarely
exceeds 5% of the total. The share that covers the capital costs of
recording, mixing and mastering is hard to break out from aggregate
capital costs in reported data, but likely accounts for less than 5% of
the total. All the rest covers artist selection and recruitment,
marketing and advertising, distribution (including wholesaler and
retailer margins) and return on capital investment.
These activities are necessary to reduce search costs for
consumers, discussed more fully in § B.4.
148. Acoustica - Easy to use audio & music recording, http://www.acoustica.com (last
visited Feb. 1, 2007).
149. Audacity: Free audio editor and recorder, at http://audactiy.sourceforge.net/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2007).
150. Email from studio manager of Studiochicago to author (16 June 2005). See also
Apocalypse Cow Recording Studios, Chicago suburbs, www.callthecow.com ($40 per hour
for mixing; $30/song for mastering) (last visited June 16, 2005); Atmosphere Recording,
Montgomery, Alabama, www.atmosphererecording.com (Studio A - $55 per hour; Studio
B - $70 per hour; Mastering - $4.00 every finished minute of a song) (last visited June 16,
2005).
151. Studio Chicago, http://www.studiochicago.com/home.cfm.
152. In the Jar Studios, http://www.inthejarstudios.com/rates.htm.
153. Studio Ballistico, http://www.studioballistico.com.
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Major record labels exist to perform intermediation in music
markets as they have been structured by past technologies. They
represent organizational capital devoted to recruiting new talent,
vetting new music, overseeing the recording process, promoting new
products, and distributing product to consumers. New technologies
profoundly change the possible ways in which the functions
performed by existing intermediaries can be performed and therefore
threaten the embedded capital of major record labels. That is why
they have been so militant in trying to slow the uptake of the
technologies.
Although aspiring musicians regularly send sample tapes and
CDs to record labels, record labels also employ talent scouts, known
as "A & R" (artist and repertoire) agents, who visit performance
venues, participate in word of mouth networks and negotiate
contracts with new talent for the label. As more musicians establish
websites with samples of their music, the search costs for artist
recruitment have declined dramatically.
The same phenomenon, however, creates more "noise" for
consumers and raises their search costs. Just as the musicians are
visible to A&R agents, they also are visible to consumers. Record
labels and other current intermediaries arose in large part to reduce
consumer search costs. This problem is considered more fully in § B.4.
The Internet has opened up enormous possibilities for marketing
music. All that one needs is a website and sufficient knowledge of
techniques for increasing the chances that the website will be picked
up by search engines such as Google. Annual hosting fees are not
likely to exceed $1,000. Even if one has a professionally designed
website developed under contract with state of the art e-commerce
features, such as ones that permit users of the website to pay for and
order or download CDs, MP3 files, and merchandise, the cost is
unlikely to exceed $5,000 to $10,000. A musician also can have an
online storefront on sites like Yahoo! for $75 per month.'-
4
Social networking sites like MySpace link musician Websites
directly to their fans through "friends" designations. In addition,
major e-commerce sites such as eBay, Yahoo!, Google, and MSN,
offer paid placement on their Websites. An advertiser can either pay
a flat monthly fee, or can elect to pay only for "click throughs"-only
when a customer actually clicks on the link of the e-commerce site
154. Google AdWords Help Center, https://adwords.google.com/support/bin/
answer.py?answer=6382 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
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and is redirected to the advertisers own Website."' This is the virtual
equivalent of being able to buy prominent shelf space in the CD
section of Borders or in a major music chain store. Not only that, the
virtual presence is global rather than purely local. An artist need not
have a deal with a major record label to engage in any of these forms
of advertising.
This replaces a system of marketing that requires human
marketing representatives to visit distributors, newspaper, radio, and
television advertising and printed brochures or leaflets. Reasonable
quantities of radio advertising time in a large market run on the order
of $3,000 to $5,000 per week per market. A high quality color
brochure or pamphlet costs on the order of $20,000 to design and
print. It is hard to buy a newspaper ad even in a small community
newspaper for less than $500 to $1,000.
Undoubtedly, the greatest economic impact of small-computer
and Internet technologies is on options for distributing music to the
end user. It is possible for someone to buy a song and download it
from a well designed site like Apple's Music Store in about 30
seconds. Online distribution enormously reduces the distribution
costs of music producers. One need only produce an MP3 file and put
it in one place on one server with adequate capacity to handle the
expected demand.
If one uses a physical distribution network, including retail
stores, the inventory cost would be on the order of $1 per year per
CD in inventory, assuming a price of $10, and a cost of money of
10%. Most people will not drive more than five miles to visit a
physical store with a supply of recorded music. Accordingly, the
inventory costs increase linearly with the size of the geographic
market a musician wants to serve. Assuming one wants to serve a
market the size of metropolitan Chicago, one would need retail store
coverage within a 25-mile radius of the central city. That is an area of
about 1,800 square miles, and using the figure of a five mile radius for
the shopping reach of a retail store, one would need to finance
inventory in about 25 stores. Assuming each store needs five copies of
a CD in inventory, that's $1,250 per year in inventory costs just for
one metropolitan area. Nationwide coverage would proportionally
increase the inventory cost. For example to extend this inventory
model to the top 100 metropolitan areas in the United States would
impose an inventory cost of $125,000 per year. And of course, there
155. Id.; A new Google advertiser can open an account for $5.00, and can then choose
a maximum cost-per-click (CPC) from $0.01 - US$100.
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are additional costs associated with inventory management: capital
costs for computer software and communications linkages, and labor
cost for delivering merchandise-or postage cost. U.S. mail costs for
distributing physical CDs approximate $2.
No longer is it necessary to manufacture CDs, to inventory them
and to ship them. Almost every PC comes with a CD burner, and one
can burn a CD from music files stored on a PC in about five minutes.
(And, of course, if most consumers listen to music in the form of MP3
files, no one needs CDs). Using this very low-end method for
manufacturing CDs has no insignificant opportunity costs. It would
take roughly 5,000 minutes or just under 70 hours to manufacture
1,000 CDs. CD duplication, including color printing, is available for
$1.60 to $2.25 each depending on the quantity.'%
Variable costs for national distribution of CDs are about
$175,000 per album.1 17 Major record labels exist to capture the
economies of scale and scope " 8 related to traditional methods of
marketing music and of manufacturing and distributing CDs. Many of
the economies of scale and scope disappear as newer technologies
take over.
Other aspects of intermediation, such as rights management, may
be less effective. Private "rights collectives" exist to reduce the
transaction costs of collecting revenue for music performance rights,
monitoring radio broadcasts and jukebox equivalents and collecting
royalties on a blanket basis for all of their members. It would be
impracticable for most musicians to perform this role on their own.
ASCAP15 9 charges a royalty of about 2% of gross advertising revenue,
BMI1 ° charges about 1.6%, and SESAC1 61 (with only about 3%
market share) charges based on a formula that depends on market
size and advertising rates. 62
156. Atmosphere Recording, www.atmosphererecording.com (follow "services"
hyperlink) (Duplication prices include media: 300 CD's - B&W $1.35ea / Color $1.60ea;
200 CD's - B&W $1.40ea / Color $1.65ea; 100 CD's - B&W $1.45ea / Color $1.70ea; 50
CD's - B&W $1.50ea / Color $1.75ea; 15-50 CD's - B&W $2.00ea / Color $2.25ea) (last
visited June 16, 2005).
157. The approximate variable costs for national distribution equals $25,000 (cost of
manufacture), plus $125,000 (cost of inventory), plus $25,000 (cost of mailing).
158. Economies of scale exist when average costs are lower for higher quantities of a
good than for smaller quantities. Economies of scope exist when average costs are lower
for a family of related goods than for a single good.
159. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
http://www.ascap.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
160. Broadcast Music, http://www.bmi.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
161. SESAC, http://www.sesac.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
162. Princeton Study, supra note 25, at 41.
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New types of rights collectives are emerging, offering more
favorable terms to musicians, and focused on using Internet
harvesting tools to monitor downloading and web streaming.163 Such
functions and the intermediaries performing them can be expected to
crystallize further over the next few years as entrepreneurs test
different business models.
3. Monetary and Non-monetary Incentives
Most people accept the proposition that economic incentives
play a dominant role in determining the supply of any good or
service. As other parts of this article argue, available evidence raises
significant doubts about the validity of this proposition for the
creation of music. In any event, the actual economic rewards to
musicians from the present system are miniscule. 64 If musicians are
primarily motivated by economic return and are rational in their
response to experience, one would expect the quantity of new music
created to be much smaller than it is. On the contrary, quantities are
high and increasing. Moreover, conduct in other spheres of new
technology exploitation suggests that many creative goods and
services are produced "for the sake of curiosity, or for the
approbation of their peers, or because it's fun."
1 65
Those non-monetary incentives will continue to operate in the
music industry. What will change is that technology will make it
possible for consumers to have access to the stock of music produced
mostly for fun. No longer will it be necessary for major record labels
to stitch together artist and consumer. Economic incentives will
become less necessary for music to be available to consumers.
4. Supply Function
Drawing on observations about revenue, costs, and incentives in
preceding sections of this part, this section suggests a supply function
for music, identifying its basic elements or variables. It also suggests
the nature of the relationship among independent variables1" and
163. See SNOCAP, Inc., http://www.snocap.com.
164. See Schorr, supra note 90, at 83-84 (reporting that 99.6% of all recording artists at
major labels are in a deficit position due to poor compensation terms, lack of bargaining
power, infeasibility of auditing major-label bookkeeping, and failure of labels to
contribute pension and welfare benefits).
165. Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEx L. REV. 1105, 1134 (2005) (characterizing
motivations of open-source-software programmers).
166. An independent variable is one that influences supply, such as, for example,
expected revenue. The dependent variable is the amount of music produced in response to
the values of the independent variables.
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between each independent variable and dependent variable, but it
defers to a following article any attempt to specify the actual
equations in closed form and the values for those variables.
At the most basic level, it is plausible that the supply of music
increases as benefits to the creator increase and decreases as costs•167
increase. The benefits from creating music include monetary
rewards, but they also include non-monetary rewards such as personal
gratification from writing and performing music that one enjoys, and
the enhanced social status from having one's friends and other
validators like the music. For example, one might be induced to write
a song because one wants a promotion on a music faculty. All these
benefits can be captured in a benefits function, although quantifying
the non-monetary benefits is challenging."6 The monetary revenue
variable must include all the sources of revenue, many of which are
complex functions of quantities sold in various submarkets. 69
Cost variables include the cost of writing and performing the
song, the cost of recording the performance, the cost of duplicating
the recording, the costs of promotion and advertising, the cost of
distributing it to consumers, and, for both original creators and
pirates, the cost of legal liability.' 70
167. S=f(B)-f(C), where S is the amount supplied, B represents benefits, and C
represents costs.
168. B-f(R) + f(A) + (G), where B is the benefit to the creator, R is revenue, A is
social status, and G is personal gratification from the creative act.
169. Roa = Rp + R. + R,. + R,, + R, where:
R,=revenue from purchases of a particular song or album in a given time period,
Ro=revenue from purchases of other songs or albums by the same artist in the same time
period,
Ria=revenue from live performances during the same time period,
Rm=revenue from sales of "merch" during the same time period,
Rr=revenue from copyright royalties paid by movie producers and advertisers for use of
the song or album, and
R,=revenue from increased salary because of improved reputation resulting from song or
album.
170. c=c + C, + c + c,+c. + cd + c
where:
c. is the cost of creation, including, for example, costs of musical instruments, music
lessons, and opportunity costs of practice time,
c is the cost of performance, including, for example, payments to other musicians, the cost
of amplification hardware and the opportunity costs of performance,
co is the cost of recording, including the cost of studio time,
c. is the cost of advertising and marketing, including promotional expenses,
c, is the cost of copying or reproduction,
cd is the cost of distribution to consumers, including costs for inventory and for billing and
collection, and
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The sophistication of the supply function can be increased by
discounting future benefits or costs to present value. 1 Capital
investment on the cost side, both human capital and physical capital,
should be amortized over time. Revenue, both direct cash revenue
and revenue from other songs and enhanced professional position, is
likely to be received over multiple periods. If a song is
commercialized, people will buy it not only in the month or year in
which it is released, but also in later months and years. If spillover or
coattail effect is important, those effects likely will be felt in later
periods. Similarly, professional advancement is quite likely to occur at
a period later than the period in which the song is released.72
Further complicating the equations are the likelihood of
interdependencies among the variables and the virtual certainty of
interaction among different songs. 7 3 So there might be an additional
revenue variable for each song that represents the residual value of
other songs already in the marketplace-a kind of proxy for the
strength of the "brand." Moreover, relationships almost certainly
exist between advertising effort and direct revenue, and between
direct revenue and reproduction and distribution costs. A complete
supply function would need to express links among those
independent variables.
Technology has no effect on purely financial factors, such as the
discount rate for present-value calculations. It has little effect on
benefit variables, except insofar new technologies cause the price to
fall and consumer exposure to increase. It has its predominant effect
on cost variables, significantly reducing the value of each, especially
the costs of reproduction, advertising, and distribution, as explained
in the preceding sections. As costs decline so will prices, especially
because the marketplace is becoming more competitive as more
creators of music have access to more consumers.
A complete supply function must take into account the fact that,
of the millions of new songs written and recorded each year, only a
c, is the cost of legal liability.
171. In addition, the amount of revenue associated with purchase of the song is likely
to decline over time. Time value factors for direct revenue should decay exponentially.
On the other hand, reputational and professional-enhancement effects are likely to
increase exponentially for a period and then tail out, representing that the relevant
audiences have forgotten about the song. In other words, it takes a while for the "word" to
get out, and then the "word" gradually becomes less interesting to potential consumers.
172. "Released" in this context means made available to others, not any particular
commercial context.
173. Rp, R., Ro, R.. and R. are positively correlated, unless one assumes that attending
a live performance is a substitute for listening to recorded music from the same artist.
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few become "hits." A supplier with significant capital costs must,
therefore, have a portfolio of songs and manage it so as to increase
the probability of some of them becoming hits. Some of the
investment in each song can be varied, especially promotional and
distribution costs. Most large labels pick only a few songs and groups
in their portfolio and invest heavily in promoting them, giving little
attention to the rest. This is a rational strategy if the probability of
any song becoming a hit is a function of promotional effort. But some
investment-typically advances paid to a performer intended to cover
recording and mixing costs-is necessary for each song in the
portfolio.
Such a portfolio-management approach is necessary when capital
costs are high, because imperfections in the capital markets make it
easier for a large enterprise such as a major record label to amass the
necessary capital and manage it than for investors to seek out
individual performers and manage their own portfolios. As capital
costs fall under the pressure of new technologies, however, it becomes
more feasible for individual performers to acquire the necessary
capital and to manage much smaller portfolios-maybe a few dozen
songs. If they get a hit, that is welcome, but millions are willing to
soldier on, still producing music, struggling to get it noticed, and
dreaming that they may become rock stars. In other words, the
market, rather than major label strategy, manages the portfolio of
multiple musicians.
The role for intellectual property in the less concentrated market
is different from the role it plays in the concentrated market.
Investors and the managers of large enterprises must deal with
uncertainty, but they try to reduce it as much as possible. It is much
easier to make strategic portfolio management decisions when you
know exactly what property rights are represented in the portfolio.
Any change in technology or law which undercuts those property
interests threatens the entire approach to portfolio risk management.
An independent artist, having a much smaller portfolio, is in a better
position to manage it on an ad-hoc basis. He has less need of
intellectual property law to reduce portfolio risk.
B. Demand
The preceding sections address the supply side. To understand
the market, one also must pay attention to the demand side. Music is
a leisure good, not a necessity of life. A piece of music may be, and
usually is, consumed more than once. The demand for music is
characterized by strong network effects-as more people consume a
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song, the greater the demand for that song becomes. Demand
includes a desire for portability in the act of consumption, and for
experiences beyond simply listening, such as knowing more about the
personalities and activities of the performers, being able to read the
lyrics, and being part of a crowd that witnesses a live performance.
The demand for music also shares with the demand for other types of
products and services features such as price elasticity, substitutability,
and diminishing returns to scale. New technologies have particularly
profound effects on portability, knowing the performers, and network
effects.
Demand for music is sensitive to price, i.e. the price elasticity of
demand is greater than one. One estimate, based on RIAA recording
music shipments data for 1992-2001, is that the price elasticity of
demand for music is 6.3.174 But the elasticity of substitution is a
function of relative price. As the price for music falls, the relative
price for legitimate music necessarily falls.
Almost any music product has partial substitutes in the market.
A consumer usually can choose between going to a live concert,
listening to a webcast of a concert, buying and playing a CD or
downloading and playing a digital file, all from the same performers
and all containing the same song. And of course, consumers may
choose among different artists within the same musical genre or
between genres and between pirated works and legitimate ones. The
propensity to entertain these possibilities is expressed in
microeconomic theory as elasticity of substitution, usually simplified
by expressing it as a function only of the relative price of the
substitutes.
But demand is also sensitive to non-price factors, such as quality
of the recording, other determinants of the musical experience (going
to a rock concert is a fundamentally different experience, compared
to listening to a CD in one's car, or to a MP3 file on one's iPod while
walking down the street), the attractiveness of the package, loyalty to
the performer, and so on.
This section evaluates the factors likely to influence the demand
for music and concludes by sketching demand functions based on
these observations. It crystallizes the non-price factors. Ultimately it
would be useful to put a dollar value on them, i.e. how much more
will a consumer pay for a really pretty and interesting CD package
174. O'Reilly Emerging Telephony, http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/wlg/2496 (last
visited June 16, 2005). If the price elasticity of demand for a product is 1.0, a 1% increase
in price results in a 1% decrease in sales.
2007]
HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.
than for a CD with the title scrawled on it with magic marker? How
much more will a consumer pay for a "legitimate" download from a
performer whom he really loves than for an illegitimate download
from the pirate?
1. Size and Scope of Market
The maximum demand for recorded music can be estimated as
follows:
Based on census figures for the age distribution of the U.S.
population in 2005, and assuming that half have no interest in
listening to music and that the remainder over age 5 and under age 95
want to listen to some music, ranging from 15 minutes per day for
those age 5 to 9 and 85 to 95, with greater amounts desired at ages in
between, peaking at 5 to 6 hours per day for those age 15 to 30,"7 one
can approximate a demand for 325 million minutes of music per day.
Assuming the average song plays for 3 minutes, that results in
demand for about 100 million "plays" per day, if consumers only
listen to music individually. In a world in which people listen to music
only on the radio, and the average radio station has an average
audience of 500 at any one time. That would result in a demand for
200,000 plays per day. As new devices for individual music listening
proliferate, the total demand will shift upward, toward the 100 million
figure.
One can assume a typical decay function for any particular song:
a consumer is likely to play it repeatedly soon after acquiring it
(assuming the consumer controls how often it is played, instead of a
radio disc jockey controlling how often it is played), and less and less
often as time passes.7 6 Assume that, a typical consumer or radio
station plays a song, on average, twenty five times over a year, and
not at all thereafter.
Combining these assumptions, one arrives at a total demand
estimate of between 73 million plays per year and 2.9 million new
songs per year, if all music is enjoyed individually, and of 1.9 million
new songs per year if one-third of all music is enjoyed on the radio. In
2006, roughly 350,000 new songs were released on CD format. So
there is considerable unmet demand.
175. The high estimate is plausible for this age group: one can imagine two hours
commuting to and from work or school, and another three hours while performing
activities of daily living.
176. But see Jeff Leeds, When All the 'Greatest Hits' Are Too Many to Download, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, §E, col. 1 (reporting that 20 years after its peak popularity, Survivor's
song "Eye of the Tiger" sold 275,000 copies once it became available on iTunes).
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One obvious implication of this analysis is that as technology
shifts the possibilities toward individual ownership and enjoyment of
music, it dramatically increases the percentage of demand that is
satisfied.
The demand for live music-for public performances-must be
estimated separately because live performances are different
experiences from listening to recorded music.17 Attending a live
performance has a social dimension that listening to recording music
over an iPod or in one's car lacks. High-school and college-age youth
and young singles are most likely to go to live concerts or to smaller
music venues, but in doing do they develop habits and tastes that
draw them back, albeit less frequently, after they are settled, with
family responsibilities.
If, as § V.B suggests, the business model for musicians favors live
performances over recording, understanding the demand for this
music format is important. Venues range from the Schuba's Tavern in
Chicago, with a maximum seating capacity of 150, through Metro in
Chicago, a jazz and rock club with a capacity of 1100, where ticket
prices often are less than $10, to Soldier Field in Chicago, with a
capacity of 60,000, at which prime seats for a Bon Jovi performance in
July, 2006 sold for $125. They include multi-band festivals such as
Lollapalooza, originally a touring experience, which introduced many
new bands playing on the "second stage"-actually a multiplicity of
stages. In its current incarnation, Lollapalooza is a three-day event in
Chicago, which drew 65,000 people to Grant Park in 2005. As the
promotional materials for the 2006 event say, "Three-day passes are
just $150. That's about $1 per band. Single-day tickets are.., just
$65." 178
177. See Andrew Jacobs, Music's Hottest Star: The Publisher, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2006, at CI (reporting that, while CD sales were down 5% in 2005, music publishing
business is booming because royalties for public performances (through recordings or
otherwise) of older songs from catalogs is stable or growing); Daniel Akst, Actually Video
Didn't Kill the Live, Onstage Star, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006 at 4 (reporting that, despite
availability of books, music and other creative fare at little or no cost over the Internet
that live performance attendance and prices for live performances are holding up well).
178. Lollapalooza 2007, www.lollapalooza.com (last visited July 29, 2006). According
to Jason Mollner, a stage, a staffed bar and room for a 400-person audience costs $300-
$600 in Omaha. Increase the audience to 2000 and the cost increases $800-$1200. Typically
bands use a local promoter. In every major city, there are a few promoters who will offer
to pay the band a fixed price or a percentage of the revenue from ticket sales. The
promoter then invests in renting a space. Advertising and promotion for small/Indie bands
is often done by the club/promoter and not the band. The band mails flyers to the club and
it is the club's responsibility to post them or advertise in the paper. Thus, advertising and
promotion costs for the band are generally low.
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According to U.S. census figures, there are about 60 million
people between the ages of 15 and 29 in 2006 and there are about 170
million between the ages of 30 and 100. If the younger group attends
live music performances once a week on average, 79 and the older
group attends twice a year on average,'" the result is an annual
demand for 3.5 million music venue seats per year. If the average
venue size is 100, I81 and at a typical performance only half the seats
are filled, that results in a demand for almost 70,000 live
performances per year.
2. Inputs and Outputs of Purchase Decisions
The total demand estimate developed in the preceding section
estimates potential demand; actual demand is far less than that.
Several factors ("inputs") influence the conversion of potential
demand for music into actual demand. Consumer tastes matter. Some
people like rock music; others like pop; others, jazz; still others,
country music. Within each of these broad genres, preferences may
run to heavy metal, or emo.
Perceived talent of artists also influences demand. A band with a
ragged-sounding drummer is less likely to appeal to many consumers
than a band with a good drummer. Some theories of the demand for
popular music emphasize variations in "quality," but that is too
simple. If it were true, only the highest quality performers would
become superstars. If everyone agreed on measures of quality, and if
no search costs existed, "only one person is needed to serve the whole
market .... ,182 But that is not the way it works. Tastes differ.
But more than the music matters. Personal attraction to the
performers drives much demand. 183 Consumers of music not only are
179. Data available from several university surveys and from other studies suggests
that more than half the college age population regularly attends live music performances,
as often as nightly during vacation periods and once or twice per week during the
academic year.
180. It is reasonable to assume that the percentage of the population attending live
performances declines as age increases, and that the frequency of attendance declines as
family and job responsibilities increases.
181. The average would be pulled upward by large stadium-size venues, and
downward by the much larger number of smaller "clubs," many seating only a few dozen.
182. Princeton Study, supra note 25, at 35 (quoting Borghans and Groot).
183. See Kelefa Sanneh, Just a Pretty Face, and Proud of It, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006,
at B1 (reporting on Justin Timberlake's emphasis on his handsome looks in promoting his
music; observing that artists work hard on albums only to get "a bunch of fans who don't
even notice; they're too busy drooling over you...") [internal quotations omitted]; See
Robert Levine, Rage Against the Record Label: The Hanson Brothers Make a Film, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2005, at C6 (reporting that audience at recent performance by Hanson
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interested in the sound of the music, they are interested in the people
who produced the sound. They want to see pictures and videos of the
performers, read about them, and know their personalities. Often,
depending on the age groups and the culture in which they are
embedded, consumers want to identify with the performers as by
wearing tee shirts or sweatshirts or having coffee mugs or computer
mouse pads showing the performers' logo. "The price of a concert
ticket is set lower than it would be in the absence of complementary
goods, because a larger audience increases sales of complements and
raises revenue." 184
Knowing what she likes, in terms of genre, style, talent, and
looks, is not sufficient, however. Search costs are also important. How
does a consumer find new music she will like? Potential consumers
hear-or hear about-the music of only a fraction of the total
numbers of musicians. Consumers may find about new songs or new
performers in several ways. A consumer may see a newspaper or
magazine advertisement for a new song and be moved to buy it. A
consumer may see a review of a musical work or a performer and
decide to buy or to listen to the reviewed music or performer. A
consumer may hear a song on the radio and decide he wants to
possess a copy so he can play it anytime he wants, or be moved to
attend a live performance. He may hear about the new song from a
friend, who tells the potential consumer about it, gives him a CD
containing the song, or emails him an MP3 file. He may see reference
to the song on a website, which may permit him to download some or
all of it. He or she may see a performer on a poster, on television, on
in a webpage "photogallery," and be attracted physically.
Rankings also affect demand through network effects,
considered in the next section.185 Rock superstars sell lots of music
just because they are superstars. The more popular the song or
performer, the more likely people are to be talking about it or her,
which reduces network effects.
Several kinds of behavior ("outputs") may result from these
stimuli: a consumer may ask others about the performer or the song;
he may immediately download it from a for-pay artist website or
service such as iTunes or Rhapsody; he may surf the Web to find out
more about the performer or the song, including the possibility of
"consisted mainly of young women," one of whom said, "As soon as I saw the poster I was
overwhelmed," and send lead performer a birthday present of his favorite food.).
184. Princeton Study, supra note 25, at 11.
185. Id. at 30 ("when you play music at a party, you would like your guests to enjoy
the music").
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listening to it from a streaming or downloadable file from the
performer's website; he may download it for free if he can find it; he
may buy a CD with the song on it; he may buy tickets to a concert, or
stop by a local bar or other music venue where the group is
performing. And of course, a consumer may do nothing.
Rational consumers choose among these behaviors depending on
the degree to which each satisfies a particular consumer's preference
function, compared with the cost of the particular behavior.
Preferences vary from artist to artist, even for an individual
consumer. For example, a consumer may download one song from
Arctic Monkeys that she really likes but nothing more because she
does not like that groups's other music, but someone else may buy the
CD of Westlife, because he enjoys its music artistry as a whole, and
perhaps also enjoys the artwork or other aspects of the CD
The capacity of different formats to satisfy consumer preferences
may vary too. CDs give artwork, and perhaps the sense that the
purchaser is supporting the artist financially. Attending a live
performance is a different experience, with social elements, from
listening to recorded music. Simple MP3 file downloading provides
neither type of satisfaction.
Networks of music aficionados meet group-affiliation needs.
Certain age groups and subcultures find music CD stores attractive
places to "hang out"-to meet their friends and to reinforce their ties
to an important social network.' 6 Being a regular at live-music
venues, allows one to talk about different music performers,
comparing musical tastes, getting the latest on the latest new-band
sensations, and gossiping about the personalities of the artists. The
costs of attending a live performance or a gathering place such as a
CD store can be significant, however, including the price of admission
and other monetary and opportunity costs of travel and the
opportunity costs of attendance for several hours.
New technologies, implemented on performer websites, 87 and
through virtual communities such as MySpace, allow consumers to
become music "groupies" without leaving their computers.
186. Some indication exists, however, that this phenomenon is fading. See Alex
Williams, The Graying of the Record Store, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2006 at § 9, 1 (reporting
that role of record [CD] store as a "clubhouse for teenagers" has declined dramatically).
187. See Andreas Kapsalis Trio-Jazz, Flamenco, Acoustic, Experimental,
http://andreaskapsalis.com (providing information about performers, schedule of
upcoming performances, reviews, downloadable music, and allowing viewers to sign up for
emails); Dick Prall, http://www.dickprall.com (same); Hijack the Disco: Rentless Press,
California, http://www.hijackthedisco.com (same, also including comments thread,
If a consumer values portability-being able to listen to the
music anywhere-he will value a format than is easily portable, such
as MP3, rather than a CD, which requires a bulkier playing device
and a physical stock of CDs. MP3 satisfies that consumer's preference
function better than a CD.
"Cost" includes more than price. Going to a bricks and mortar
store to buy a CD imposes much higher transaction costs on a
consumer than downloading it from a computer on which iTunes is
already installed and which is already connected to the Internet.
Transaction costs also include risk, such as being sued or prosecuted
for copyright infringement or getting a virus or some other harmful
code from downloaded music.
Estimating demand is complicated by the uncertainty of the
relationship among different ways consumers can enjoy music from
the same performer. CDs and MP3 files may be substitutes-one
chooses between the CD and an MP3 file containing the same song,
but they also may be complementary-one hears a song on an MP3
file and buys the CD containing the song as a result. Live
performances and both recorded-music formats are more likely
complementary than substitutes. A consumer does not choose
between listening to a recording of Dick Prall and attending one of
his performances; one is more likely to go to a performance because
he has heard an MP3 or CD recording.
One could of course construct a probability function for each
outcome-the purchase of a particular song in a particular format, as
a function of all the inputs, and the relative costs of substitutable
outcomes-the purchase or other acquisition of other songs and
formats. Such a function would compute the probability of paying to
download a song if a consumer hears it and reads a review, but gets
no other inputs; the probability of buying a CD if the consumer hears
about the song from a friend, listens to a streaming version on the
Web, and then is offered a ride to Borders by the friend, the
probability of seeking out and attending a venue where a group is
performing because one has heard a song by the group, and so on.
These functions could be either empirically or theoretically based.
Construction of such demand functions is beyond the scope of this
article, although the article suggests certain key features of the likely
demand functions.
allowing anyone to post comments and messages); Coldplay: Official Site,
http://www.coldplay.com (same, also allowing viewers to become "members," and offering
chat room).
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3. Network Effects and Demand for Complementary Products
Earlier sections of this article point out that strong network
effects shape the demand for music. The more popular a piece of
music is, the more rapidly its popularity spreads. '89 The more popular
a performer becomes, the faster his popularity accelerates.
Consumers want to share a common culture."
Not only does pop culture manifest itself in the desire to know
about and to have experienced the latest "big thing," the more
popular a piece of music is, the more likely a potential consumer will
hear about it through word of mouth or in press or media reviews and
the more likely the consumer is to hear it on the radio.
Superstars exist not mainly because of differences in talent but
because consumers want to share a common culture.'91 The more
popular a performer becomes, the faster his popularity accelerates.
And the deceleration is gradual: Madonna is not what she was, but
seems to be able to sell a constant level of new albums. The same for
the likes of Prince, Pearl Jam, Bon Jovi-long past their prime but
still able to maintain a relatively constant level of demand. The
intuition that network effects are important determinants of the
demand for music is reinforced by a study recently completed by
Columbia University music laboratory personnel. "" The study
included almost 15,000 participants recruited from teenage-oriented
188. Network effects are the same as "bandwagon effect" in ordinary discourse-high
network externalities, in more formal terms. See generally Michael Abramowicz, An
Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 87
n.153, 155 (2004) (noting that the demand for music experiences network externalities-"I
invest in music to be in the cool crowd"-but each investment may "harm others by
diluting their relative coolness quotient"). According to Metcalfe's law, the usefulness, or
utility, of a network equals the square of the number of users. John T. Nakahata,
Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting Communications
Regulation from the Bottom Up, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 95, 135 (2002)
(analyzing network effects in terms of tendency toward monopoly in communications
networks).
189. See generally Abramowicz, supra, note 188, at 87 n.153, 155 (noting that the
demand for music experiences network externalities-"I invest in music to be in the cool
crowd"-but each investment may "harm others by diluting their relative coolness
quotient"). According to Metcalfe's law, the usefulness, or utility, of a network equals the
square of the number of users. Nakahata, supra, note 188 at 95, 135 (analyzing network
effects in terms of tendency toward monopoly in communications networks).
190. Princeton Study, supra note 25, at 35.
191. Id.
192. Matthew J. Salganik et al., Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability
in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCIENCE 854 (2006) [hereinafter "Columbia Music
Study"]; see also Benedict Carey, In Music, Others' Tastes May Help Shape Your Own,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006 at D7 (describing Columbia Music Study).
Internet sites. One-half of the experiment produced a rough
consumer-rating of song quality. The other half of the experiment
presented subjects with information about the number of previous
downloads for each song by other members of their teenage interest
group. "A small group of people making decisions at the beginning
had a large influence on how the songs were ultimately ranked." '193
The experiment demonstrated that consumers with little information
to guide their choices of songs are strongly influenced by other
consumers' behavior. The result of a kind of "cascade effect" in favor
of the songs chosen first.194
This suggests that demand can be increased by giving music away
to build the fan base, much as America Online built its consumer base
by giving away its software. 95 For a time in the late nineties, one
could not open one's mailbox, or open the newspaper or a magazine
without a free disk with AOL software on it falling out. But it also is
true that not all giveaway programs are successful. The cemeteries of
the dot-com bubble are littered with enterprises whose business
model was premised on building market share-or "attracting
eyeballs," in the parlance of the Web venture-capital and
entrepreneur culture-at a loss, with profits to come automatically
once a customer base was established. For many firms, the profits
never materialized. Similarly, a musician or a promoter also may
spend money on producing music, giving it away in the expectation
that he will build audience for download sales or for concerts, and for
the paying customers never to materialize in sufficient numbers to
offset the investment in the promotion.
4. Search Costs
"Time is money." Time also is not unlimited. 350,000 new songs
were released on CD format in 2006. If each one takes three minutes
to play, and the average consumer listens to only one minute before
193. Id., 7 [internal quotations omitted].
194. Id.
195. As Jason Mollner, one of my musician-students, said, "I know of many bands
(like my old band) that give away songs for free on websites like
http://www.purevolume.com/backwhen. Fans cruise these sites looking for new music and
.when they listen to Back When's music, they have links to the Back When website where
they can contact Back When about shows, t-shirts, buttons, a CD with full insert, or they
can just talk to the community of other Back When fans. This has helped Back When's
fanbase increase in areas where they have never performed or ever been promoted. I
think of a MP3 as a kind of book review. It is a synopsis of the entire experience that the
band can create through their live performance, their cover art, t-shirt art, or a reading of
their lyrics in the CD insert."
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deciding whether he likes it, it would require 350,000 minutes, or
about 6,000 hours to sample all of them. That is 250 days per year,
without allowing any time for sleep. No one is that compulsive about
music, apart from the physiological problems of sleep deprivation.
And that does not allow for the other new songs created each year
that never get released on CDs by major record labels. They surely
number in the tens of millions. So consumers need some way to
reduce search costs.
The existing music marketplace offers several types of
intermediaries whose principal reason for being is to reduce search
costs-and to satisfy a part of the demand as they do so. When radio
stations play music, they bring consumers into contact with songs they
never had heard before. Music reviewers tell consumers about new
songs and new musician groups. Retailers of CDs, including
Starbucks, have displays to make consumers aware of new music.
Albums not only force consumers to buy songs they may not have
been interested in, but at the same time expose them to new songs
they may like. Print and media advertising, some through general
audience publications, and some through special-audience
publications such as Rolling Stone and Spin tell consumers about new
music purchase possibilities.
Record labels similarly reduce search costs by purportedly
weeding out the good from the bad in the enormous inventory of new
music. But it is difficult for an A & R representative of a record label
to be sure that her tastes match those of all the subsets of consumers,
and economics influence label decisions as much as perceived quality
of the music.
New technologies reduce search costs further. The Web creates
new channels through which a consumer may come into contact with
a song for the first time. It makes it easier to find out about the
performers, most of whom have websites--even those who have not
"broken through" yet.1 6 This presents much lower transaction costs
to purchasers than going to a physical store, finding an interesting CD
and standing in line to pay for it.
5. Demand Function
Eventually, unless copyright law impedes taking advantage of
new technologies, and is enforceable, the same technologies that
reduce the cost and open up new alternatives for music production
also increase consumer demand for music.
196. See e.g. Studio Ballistico, http://www.studioballistico.com.
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Demand for a song from a particular source is a function 9 7 of
price, 9' perceived quality of the music, '99 transaction cost of obtaining
the song (including search costs),2m "altruism" toward the supplier-
the possibility that a consumer may identify with the performer and
therefore want to purchase music from a source that maximizes
revenue flow to the creator,"1 popularity of the song with others in
social groups to which the consumer feels a connection, 2°2
inconvenience of listening to the song,0 3 perceived probability of
obtaining a corrupted file, 2' and perceived probability of legal
liability.205
New technologies reduce transaction costs and inconvenience of
listening to downloaded MP3 files, compared with physical CDs. The
availability of recorded music in the form of MP3 files downloadable
from "legitimate" sources reduces the probability of getting corrupted
files and of legal liability, relative to "illicit" sources, and also reduces
the relative price of "legitimate" sources, compared with illicit
sources. It also increases the likelihood that a favored musician will
get some of the revenue. Thus the demand function suggests a shift
from CDs to files and a shift from illicit sources to legitimate sources.
Technology's influence on convenience is especially profound.
The phenomenon began with transistor radios and boom boxes and
accelerated with the introduction of the first Sony Walkman. With
197. Di=f(pi, qi, tc%, aj,, s,, ii.v, 11i), where D=demand for a song in a particular form, i,
and the independent variable are as defined and explained in the following notes and
accompanying text.
198. pi= price, and the function is an decreasing one (the higher the price, the less the
demand, with greater elasticity in the middle
199. qi= perceived quality, where the function is an increasing one, with greater
elasticity at the low end
200. tc= transaction costs of obtaining the song, where the function is a decreasing
one, with greater elasticity at the low end
201. ai="altruism" toward supplier, where the function is an increasing one, probably
with a discontinuity
202. s,= popularity of song; network effects suggest that the influence of this variable
would exponentially increase to some upper limit
203. ii= inconvenience of using song, where the function is a decreasing one, with
greater elasticity in the middle
204. vi= perceived probability of getting a corrupted file, such as one including a virus
or spyware, where the function is a decreasing one, with greater elasticity at the high end
205. 11i= perceived probability of legal liability, where the function is a decreasing one,
probably with a discontinuity; it may be a step function, and the other dependent variables
represent factors identified in the preceding notes. The probability of getting a virus and
the inconvenience could be lumped into transaction costs, but they are shown separately




iPod technology, music is completely portable. One can have
thousands of songs recorded on an iPod and carry it around in his or
her shirt pocket. If one wants to enjoy the music recorded on an iPod
as part of a group, one simply plugs the iPod into an amplifier and all
of the amplification and speaker options are available that would be
available for playing a CD or a vinyl record. One can still buy a CD
and download the songs to a PC and then copy them to an iPod, but it
is much easier simply to buy the songs online and copy them directly
to an iPod. This is exactly how Apple's iTunes works. Great
portability increases the total amount of realizable demand for music
rather than merely influencing market share. It makes it possible for
consumers to spend more of their waking time listening to music.
Producers and other intermediaries can impede this portability
by making it more difficult to rip a CD by incorporating encryption
technologies and by refusing to license their music to iTunes,
Rhapsody, or competitors. Technical standards exist for universal
compatibility. Almost everyone has adopted the MP3 format for
music files, and the experience suggests that future standards can be
adopted with similar alacrity. Incompatibility of formats is most
closely associated with copy protection-"digital rights management"
("DRM") is the more elegant term preferred by music suppliers.2'
Apple, for example, deliberately makes iTunes formats impossible to
play on devices other than iPods, unless the files are modified.
°0
Apple does this to protect its dominant position in the market for
both music and portable music players. It is, for the short term at
least, in Apple's interest to have iPods work only with the iMusic
store and vice versa. Eventually, well financed competitors like
Microsoft and Yahoo! probably will gain enough market share to
induce Apple to open up its hardware and e-commerce sites to
competitors. It is irrational for producers to exclude themselves from
this rapidly growing new distribution channel and thus to stunt total
demand.
206. See Tom Zeller, Jr., The Ghost in the CD, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at C1
(reporting that Sony-BMG's effort at copy-protecting its music CDs backfired when
consumers discovered that the DRM software exposed user computers to viruses, Trojan
Horses, spywire and other malicious software).
207. Actually, all one has to do is to modify the file name. See Thomas Crampton,
Paris Approves Law Aimed at Making iTunes Compatible with Rival Devices, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2006, at B4 (reporting on final adoption of French statute that would reduce
penalties for illegal downloading of music to those for minor offense and that would
prohibit copy protection schemes that limit consumer use of purchased music on devices
consumer chooses).
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Higher search costs inflate the transaction-cost variable and
reduce demand. The technologies make more music available and
make it easier for consumers to acquire it, but where should a
consumer look for it? How does she decide if she wants it? No one is
going to search thousands of web pages that might contain appealing
music. Some form of intermediation is necessary to reduce search
costs for consumers, but it is unlikely to take the form of existing
record labels in their present configuration.
The altruism variable incorporates factors such as a performer's
''sex appeal," and identification with the performer and the
community of other admirers of that performer. "Groupies" are more
likely to be willing to pay for the music of the target of their
attachment, as a way of rewarding the target.
Whether consumers prefer to purchase music licensed by the
copyright holder in order to avoid copyright infringement associated
with free file-sharing services, or whether they are lured by the
chance to get music for free, is another question. The pirated versus
legitimate purchase question exists for every consumer, regardless of
whether the consumer prefers CDs, or MP3 files. A student note
offers useful estimates of demand functions that highlight the factors
that may encourage or discourage illicit file sharing.208 Law's deterrent
effect depends on the magnitude of the penalties and the
decisionmaker's perceived probability of getting caught. 209 For some
208. Aaron D. Delgado, Confessions of a Tennis Shoe Pirate-Can Proper Pricing of
Factors of Production Deter Copyright Infringement?, 8 U.FLA.J.TECH.L. & POL'Y 179
(2003) (Mr. Delgado's economic analysis is better than his legal analysis. He ignores fair
use while identifying the first-sale doctrine and the possibility of substantial non-infringing
uses as the most important sources of privileges for copying music); Id. at 184 (He treats
purchasing an unauthorized copy as an act likely to lead to liability); Id. at 189
(Nevertheless, his economic analysis is insightful).
209. Id. at 188-189 (Mr. Delgado's equations for this facet of the decisionmaking
process are:
Po,,= (F*R,) + C
Where P_,, = is the cost of an illicit copy
F = fine for copyright infringement
R,=probabability of fine being imposed
C=physical cost of copying
If incarceration is a possibility, the cost function for the illicit copy becomes:
P_,,=[(J*W*Rp + C]/(l+r)*J
Where
J=jail sentence in years
W=lost wages per year of incarceration
r=discount rate
As published, this equation calculates the cost of incarceration for one year; it would have
to be modified to reflect the total cost of incarceration for more than one year.
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consumers, the decision whether to buy a legitimate copy or to
acquire an illicit copy may depend on opportunity cost-the value the
decisionmaker imputes to his or her time.20 Teenagers are more
likely to obtain illicit copies of music than physicians because they
have so much more leisure time than physicians."' The note also
identifies what it calls a "nouveau" variable, to account for the
greater value that may be associated with a legitimate CD because of
photographs, interviews and video clips packaged with the CD.212
Because the note does not consider consumer decisions with respect
to purchase of a legitimate CD versus downloading of an illicit MP3
file, it does not probe the most interesting question-whether file
sharing enhances or undermines revenue streams to artists. The basic
models presented however, are useful starting points for a more
robust model that would encompass CD versus MP3 decisions. 1
3
The importance of the demand function expressed in note 197
for the risk of free riding is that it includes terms other than a price
term. The relative price for legitimate music compared to pirated
music will decline, as § IV.A.4 above explains. It may not go to zero,
and thus pirates' price advantage will continue to pull some
consumers in their direction. But as the relative price advantage
declines, it will pull fewer consumers away from legitimate sources.
More importantly, price is not all that matters. As e-commerce for
A rational consumer will choose the illicit copy as the cost of the copy is lower than the
cost of a legitimate copy: as long as Pcopy<Paut,ntc.
Mr. Delgado's function can be understood as focusing on the pi and Ii variables in the
demand function expressed in note 198).
210. Mr. Delgado presents the following equation to illustrate the role of opportunity
cost:
py= *Pm + [( *P,)Ix] + T(W* ) + N
Where P.= unit price of blank media
P,=price of recording device
N=nouveau factor
W=wages per unit time
T=time to make a copy, including search costs
=time weighting factor increasing with time
=time weighting factor declining with time, and
X=number of copies made on the same device
211. Delgado, supra note 200 at 190-191.
212. Id. at 191-192.
213. All that is necessary is to substitute variables representing the "investment"
necessary to obtain MP3 files, comparable to the purchase of blank CDs and of CD
burning hardware and to illustrate the factors that are likely to alter the opportunity cost
effect significantly in the MP3 world-chiefly the additional time required to locate a
desired file on non-commercial services, and the probability of obtaining a corrupt file and
the time required to undo the damage if a corrupt file is acquired.
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popular music develops, consumers will be able to get more of what
they want from legitimate Web-based sources for music. Participating
in communities sponsored by artists will enhance the value of the
altruism variable.
Illicit channels for music distribution will continue to present a
significantly higher risk of getting corrupted or inferior files, and
viruses. That will increase the (already negative) value of the quality
variable (qi) and the corruption variable (vi). Legitimate distributors
of music can weaken the importance of the
convenience/quality/corruption variables in pushing consumers
toward legitimate sources of music, however. Most digital rights
management schemes make consumption of legitimate sources of
music more cumbersome than would be the case without DRM. At
some point, struggling with DRM limitations, beyond the control of
ordinary computer users, drives the quality and corruption and
convenience variables in the favor of pirated sources of music. If
something may happen so that my collection of purchased music
becomes inaccessible, I may as well get pirated music from which I
may get an occasional virus that mostly can be controlled by antivirus
programs.
Just one example is the apparently innocuous DRM protections
built into iTunes Windows Media Player and Sony Sonic Stage. They
routinely check an Internet-connected database for information on
new songs imported into music libraries. Often they cannot find the
song in the database because it has been created and recorded by a
small independent musician who has not put data in the database.
Nevertheless, acquisition and possession of the music may be entirely
legitimate-as when I import music I myself created into one of these
music library managers. Although it is not difficult to cancel the query
to the master database and to include the imported file anyway, the
need to do so is somewhat cumbersome and the effect of the window
opening asking a consumer to choose among alternatives in the
database is at least confusing and might deter some consumers from
enjoying the unregistered music.
The threat of legal liability also will continue to play a role and
aggressive efforts by the music industry to enforce copyrights against
ordinary consumers and those that make it easier for ordinary
consumers to get illicit copies of music will always have some effect in
increasing the (already negative) value of the legal liability variable.
It also, however is likely to decrease the value of the altruism variable
because consumers are angry about what they see as overreaching
and abuse of the legal system by existing industry giants.
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For many consumers the altruism variable dominates. When
some consumers hear a new song, the first thing they do is to try to
find a photograph of the performers. If they like their looks they are
more likely to buy their music, often more music-more songs or
more than one album-than they heard. It is not only looks, of
course; it also is the ethos that the performers communicate:
rebellion, striving, solidarity with each other, commitment to hope,
commitment to certain kinds of traditional values. The Web facilitates
making all of this readily available to consumers and thus increasing
their vicarious social attachment to the artists. If, on the other hand,
consumers believe that a purchase will benefit artists or those labels
with whom artists have made a deal that are abusing teenagers and
elderly grandparents, this powerful altruism factor can sour.
C. Combined effect
1. On Supply and Demand
The new technologies will transform the marketplace for music
because they reduce the costs for advertising, promotion and
distribution of music nearly to zero, while they increase the overall
demand by making music more portable. As demand increases, it will
be satisfied by more music produced by Indie musicians, who will
bypass traditional intermediation functions performed by the major
labels.
Prices will fall as costs decline, further increasing demand. Total
revenue may fall because of lower prices and more competition but
more of it will be available to Indie musicians who were largely shut
out of yesterday's market by the major labels.
On the supply side, costs will fall dramatically, for most of the
variables in the supply function constructed in § IV.A.4 above. The
most significant barrier to entry in the past was the cost of
advertising, promotion and distribution, which only could be borne
efficiently by major labels. Those were the greatest costs in past
business models, far greater than the human and physical capital costs
of initially creating and producing music, which also are declining
because of new recording technologies. Because new technologies
reduce these costs so much, compared to traditional means of
production, marketing and distribution, the barriers to entry for
"undiscovered"214 musicians are greatly reduced, increasing the supply
214. "Undiscovered" signifies musicians and groups that have not attained a large
consumer following through a major-label deal or otherwise.
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of music. These musicians manage much smaller, portfolios than the
record labels-maybe a few dozen songs. Some may get a hit, that is
welcome, but most will not and will nevertheless persevere, still
producing music, building networks of fans, enjoying gradually
increasing social status and personal gratification as more people hear
their music, while still dreaming that they may become rock stars.
Because less is at risk financially, they will be less frantic to make it
big quickly.
Incentives to give away more music to build fan base will put
further pressure on prices. Musicians will develop business models
that place less emphasis on revenue from sales of recorded music.
Live performances will continue to dominate the business models for
most musicians. Most of the income stream for artists will continue to
come from live performances, for which CDs were, and MP3 files now
are, essentially advertising.
Unlicensed file sharing will become less controversial because it
will become less distinguishable from consumer conduct desired by
musicians. File sharing enabled by the Internet further reduces
advertising and promotion costs. Moreover, the newer technologies
permit artists to retain greater control over how file sharing and other
forms of music sampling take place. Artists can put samples of their
music on their Website, offer samples-often one minute of a song in
MP3 format, on intermediary Websites such as CD Baby. They can
use sites like MySpace to limit the communities within which file
sharing occurs.
On the demand side, the shift to consuming music in the form of
digital music files loaded onto portable players enlarges the amount
of time available to consumers for listening to music, potentially
increasing demand by a factor of two or more, and they will want
more music to listen to. Finding appealing music will become easier
because new architectures will keep search costs manageable." 5
Altruism toward artists will increase because social networking
through virtual communities such as MySpace and more complete
artist websites216 allow consumers to get "closer" to the musicians and
their personalities. Consumers can become music "groupies" without
leaving home. It is no longer necessary to get backstage in the
215. New architectures to manage search costs are considered more fully in § IV.C.3.
216. See http://www.andreaskapsalis.com (last visited on April 3, 2007) (providing
information about performers, schedule of upcoming performances, reviews,
downloadable music, and allowing viewers to sign up for emails); http://www.dickprall.com
(last visited on April 3, 2007) (same); http://www.coldplay.com (last visited on April 3,
2007) (same, also allowing viewers to become "members," and offering chat room).
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physical sense-an opportunity available to few. One can get
backstage-and almost in the bedrooms-of performers through web
spaces offering virtual communities. New kinds of network effects will
reduce total demand for "top" songs, while they increase demand for
less famous musicians through new virtual social networks focused on
particular genres or clusters of performers.
The new technologies will shift demand toward Indie musicians
and their intermediaries at the expense of major record labels and
artists under contract with them. 7 Once a consumer knows that he
might enjoy music from an Indie artist, it is just as easy to acquire that
music as to acquire music sponsored by a major label-maybe easier
if major labels continue to burden their offerings with DRM or
withhold them altogether from major download sites. The costs for
competitors of Indie musicians, including major labels and pirates,
will go down too, but labels do not want to undercut their existing
business models, and will continue to resist wholesale adoption of the
new technologies and business models and concomitant price
reductions.1 8 MP3 and Web technologies reduce the barriers to
breaking through, based on talent; compare the experience of Clap
Your Hands Say Yeah, or Coldplay, which distributed free MP3 files
on the Internet, with Jimi Hendrix or Bob Dylan, who played for
years in out-of-the-way clubs before a music-industry executive
stumbled across them.219
217. There is no significant difference between the music genres available from both
types of artist and intermediary, notwithstanding some claims that the sources produce
distinct types of music. See Miller supra note 2 at 329 (arguing that Indie music does not
compete directly with major-label music, which tends toward heavy metal, while Indie
music tends toward Beach Boys, Bob Dylan, Johnny Cash, rock-and-roll, and folk).
218. See Steven Levy, Why Don't We Do It on the Internet, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 2006,
at 16 (reporting that Beatles have been unwilling to allow their music to be sold online
through services such as iTunes or Rhapsody); Jeff Leeds, Labels Halt Downloads to
Increase CD Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at El (reporting on major label that delayed
sales of song on iTunes for two months after radio play started to allow time for CD sales
in record stores to mature); cf. Robert W. Cort, Straight to DVD, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2006, at A15 (arguing that movie producers should release DVD formats of movies as
soon at they are released in theaters; consumers would still go to theaters; otherwise piracy
is encouraged, costing industry $6 billion per year).
219. See Johnnie L. Roberts, Edgar and the Indies, NEWSWEEK, May 22, 2006, at 42
(reporting that "superstar" group Arctic Monkeys "first got a buzz going through Internet
downloads and chat rooms;" other Indie groups, "long spurned by radio and other
traditional outlets," use internet to reach fans eager to discover new music artists; "not
uncommon" for Indie group to generate sales of 300,000 or more with low marketing
costs); David Carr, Media Age Business Tips from U2, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at C1
(reporting that U2's success in attracting four million fans to 130-sold-out shows in 1005,
grossing $300 million, while selling eight million copies of latest CD, after 35 years as a top
group is due to its effective management of a portfolio of assets, including website that
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The impact of new technologies on the demand for live
performances by major stars will be marginal because these
performers and their promoters already have access to mass media.
The impact will be greater for undiscovered musicians because it
gives them access to the mass market with whatever targeting of
subgroups the musicians want. The result may be an increase in
attendance at live performances for less famous musicians. It is more
likely to pull consumers towards smaller venues where musicians they
discovered through the web are performing. In other words,
consumers will use more of their leisure time available for live music
performances to enjoy the music of less-known groups.
CDs are dead, or soon will be. The end result of technology's
impact on demand functions is almost certain to extinguish demand
for CDs. The convenience of downloading a song or an album into a
portable music player overwhelms the inconvenience of going to
Tower Records or Borders hoping to find the desired CD, standing in
line to pay for it, and then transferring the songs to a portable
player." ° Major-label CDs are doomed not because downloadable
music is available for free, but because it provides better utility for
consumers at the same or a lower price.
Conventional music radio likewise is threatened; although music
radio offers more than music - news, traffic, and weather-and it
affords the opportunity to hear new music. Having your own playlist
is better than listening to the DJ's. On the other hand, hearing new
songs on the radio is an easy way to mitigate search costs.
2. On Piracy
New technologies always affect the externalities that influence
the likelihood of private bargaining producing Pareto-optimal
allocations of resources. Much of the public policy debate over music
file sharing proceeds as though the new digital technologies deployed
through the Internet increase the risk of free riding, and leave
demand unchanged. Such an assumption is profoundly incorrect. The
indexes every song and lyric, tour news refreshed daily, and subscriber features including
priority access to tickets, exclusive content, streaming downloads of every song and
exclusive videos; promoting the downloading of music through special edition iPod);
Kelefa Sanneh, A Scrappy Jam Band, but Hold the Jam, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at E5
(reporting that O.A.R. cultivated a "rabid" audience by playing concerts nonstop and by
encouraging fans to share recordings).
220. CDs do offer positive externalities, such as finding other CDs of which a
consumer was unaware by looking at recommendations made by a store owner
(particularly for Indie record stores).
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preceding section explains how the new technologies dramatically
increase demand for music."'
Conclusions differ about the overall effect of file sharing on
different elements of the music industry. Some economists conclude
that social welfare is increased, with less-known musicians benefiting
the most, at the expense of intermediaries and super stars. 22 Others,
of course, conclude that social welfare is diminished.2 3 One overview
of the declining fortunes of major record labels 24 concludes that the
decline is unlikely to be attributable to music downloading and CD
burning and more likely to be due to industry consolidation, musician
resistance to economic terms imposed by major labels, and the major
labels' "current ineffective business models and use of the
Internet.,225  Widely-respected and industry-oriented Forrester
Research reaches the same conclusion.
22 6
Furthermore, the new technologies actually may reduce the risk
of free riding. Digital duplication dissemination through the Internet
cost less than older means of copying and distributing of music. This,
considered by itself, would seem to increase the risks of free riding.
But the same technologies also reduce the fixed costs of music
creators and producers.
Free riding occurs because the pirate can satisfy some or all of
the demand at a price lower than the creator needs to cover the
creator's costs. Being unable to cover his costs, the creator will stop
producing, or will produce less-unless non-economic motivations
induce him to subsidize consumption. Some artists will always make
music for the fun of it.
The risk of free riding is proportional to the gap between the
creator's costs and the pirate's costs. Changes in technology have
narrowed the gap because they have reduced the creator's costs more
221. Miller, supra note 2 (arguing file sharing represents consumer preferences in the
face of "years of foisting shoddy bands and overpriced albums on the public" by the
recording industry).
222. See Litman, supra note 7, at 28 (discussing competing views on incentives and
effect of file sharing; some musicians produce because music is what they love and do best;
others are motivated by the possibility of making a fortune as next big rock star).
223. Princeton Study, supra note 112, at 60-61 (reviewing studies).
224. Data shows that shipments of recordings in the United States fell more than 15%
from 2000 to 2002, resulting in the layoff of 5,000 and 10,000 music-industry employees.
Schorr, supra note 90, at 72-73. "Pressured by shareholders, music executives more than
ever are concentrating on economic returns, focusing on only a few superstar musicians-
turned-celebrities and neglecting other recording artists. Accordingly, all parties-the
public, the music labels, and the musicians-suffer in the current environment." Id. at 73.
225. Id. at 73-74.
226. Id. at 82, n.76 (citing Forrester Report)
[29.3
NEW ARCHITEC TURES FOR MUSIC
than they have reduced the pirate's costs. To evaluate technology's
effects on the free riding risk, one must consider creator and pirate
cost structures, drawing on the supply function developed supra. Both
structures comprise fixed and variable costs. Examples of fixed costs
for the creator include lessons, the opportunity cost of practicing,
instruments, audio equipment, mixing and editing equipment, web
servers, and CD manufacturing hardware. Examples of fixed costs for
pirates include CD copying equipment and web servers. Variable
costs for both include the cost of blank CDs, packaging costs, rental
for websites, and advertising costs.
Total costs, which determine viable prices, vary with volume
because fixed costs must be averaged over the total quantity of
product sold. One can envision the graph of a cost function, with
quantity along the X axis and dollars along the Y axis. The function
will curve downward to the right, with the average cost of a CD or a
single download diminishing as more are sold.227
The following graph shows, in simplified form, the likely effects
of new technologies.
Creator and Pirate Cost CurvesCost per unit
KEY:
A: Average costs for a pirate




A pirate's variable cost may fall as well when pirates use newer
technologies to duplicate music and distribute it. That might lead to
the conclusion that the pirate's cost advantage always remains and the
227. The first derivative of this function is negative. The second derivative also is
negative, at least until diminishing returns set in (volume becomes so great that either
producer must buy another web server or CD duplication device).
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pirate always will be able to offer pirated works at prices lower than
the originator because the pirate never has to incur fixed costs. In
other words, the originator simply would be chasing the pirate's costs
downward. But what matters with respect to elasticity of substitution
is not the absolute price for the legitimate work, but the relative price
advantage the pirate enjoys. Virtually all economic models of
consumer choice among substitute goods express the likelihood that
consumers will shift to a substitute good as a function of relative, not
absolute, price. 2 8 The result of technology is to reduce marginal costs
close to zero for the originator and to reduce fixed costs dramatically
because of the impact of technology on production costs and its even
more dramatic impact on promotion and distribution costs. The result
is that the relative price advantage of pirated works22 will be sharply
reduced. Pirates will continue to try to steal music, but they will sell
proportionately less of it because their price advantage will be
reduced. Piracy is becoming less of an economic threat because
technology is narrowing the gap between creator costs and pirate
costs. Technology reduces fixed costs and promotion and distribution
costs for creators, reducing the price necessary for them to recover
their full costs. Therefore, at the margin, the demand for pirated
works relative to the demand for legitimate works will fall, permitting
other factors in the demand function to dominate and to push
consumers toward legitimate works.
As the relative price advantage of pirates declines, it will pull
fewer consumers away from legitimate sources. People will pay to
download music. Cable television and bottled water prove that it is
possible to "compete with free." Lower prices for consumers mean
more of them will consume more music. Lower prices for consumers
mean more will buy than steal. More importantly, price is not all that
matters. As e-commerce for popular music develops, consumers will
be able to get more of what they want from legitimate Web-based
sources for music.231
228. See generally Valentino Piana, Substitute Goods (2005),
http://www.economicswebinstitute.org/glossary/substitute.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
229. Relative price advantage can be represented as expressing the price for the
pirated work as a percentage of the price for the legitimate work.
230. James Snider, Fear and Loathing in Hollywood - Again, ELECTRONIC NEWS,
Feb. 10, 2003, available at http://www.edn.com/article/CA274972.html.
231. So the shift of consumer demand between legitimate and pirated sources of the
same musical work will be driven by the same factors traditionally used to estimate cross
elasticity of demand among substitute products. In this analytical framework, each
variable in the demand function can be expressed as the relative value of that variable
between legitimate and pirated sources of the same work. For example, not only would the
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It is important to remember that creators of music enjoy
advantages over free riders not fully explained by analysis of their
economic production functions. Of particular importance are lead
time and search costs. A creator who keeps up of the pace of
creativity offers new products desired by consumers frequently. These
products are available from the creator for some period of time
before free riders discover them, decide to copy them, and actually do
the copying and distribution. During the lag between creator and free
rider activity, the creator enjoys a window of opportunity free from
the risk of free riding. The risk of piracy will stimulate creation of new
music as the lead-time advantage for creators gets shorter, and
performers will want a new song to steal back the audience just as the
pirate gets ramped up to deliver the old one. The model is the same
as that for new versions of PC software.
Search costs also advantage the creator. Creators of music and
other information goods benefit from making it easy for consumers to
find them, with stable, highly visible websites or through more
traditional means. Free riders also benefit from making it easy for
consumers to find them, but they also have to take into account the
likelihood that they will get caught and sued or prosecuted for
copyright or trademark infringement. Thus free riders are less likely
than creators to maintain highly visible, stable Websites or other
commercial presence. Even slightly greater search costs for finding
music from free riders benefits creators.
None of these techniques blocks consumer use of completely
unauthorized file sharing sites such as the old Grokster, but they offer
some of the same advantages of file sharing to consumers that the
unauthorized sites offer, therefore bleeding off at least some of the
demand for illicit file sharing. Even illicit file sharing reduces barriers
to commercial transactions between consumers and artists. It reduces
consumer search costs and thereby makes it easier for consumers to
find music they may like enough to buy. And it reduces the cost of
distributing music by artists thereby freeing up resources for more
innovative ways to match consumer tastes. The risks of viruses,
spyware and spain are far less on iTunes than on free file sharing
networks and the search costs are less because almost everything is
(or will be) available from iTunes.
The point is not that all users of the different forms of file
sharing will now purchase every song they sample, but some will.
price variable be expressed as relative price, but the convenience variable would be
expressed as relative convenience, the altruism variable as relative altruism, and so on.
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Successful marketing of any product or service has never required
that a producer must peel all potential consumers away from
alternative products or services; it merely requires that enough be
pried away to support the producers business model. The newer
technologies, including musician-encouraged file sharing make that
likely.
So: the likely effect of new technologies is not dramatically to
increase the free-riding risk. It reduces prices and consumer costs for
acquiring new music from legitimate sources so much that residual
free riding is is of far less importance than commonly believed. The
proposition that technology increases free riding risks so much that it
swamps these other effects is entirely unsubstantiated, either
theoretically or empirically.
If externalities are constant or reduced, the Coase paradigm
suggests that law need not play a greater role, and that public policy
and allocative efficiency may best be served by law playing less of a
role.
3. On Intermediation: Connecting Musicians and Their Fans
Increased supply, of course, is not an unmixed blessing. As the
number of suppliers increases, search and coordination costs increase
for intermediaries and for consumers. The great unanswered question
about the structure of the market is how search costs will be managed
with new technologies. For consumers to benefit from a greater
supply of music, offered at lower prices, they must be able to find it
without encountering intolerable search costs. The Internet
undermines old models for reducing search costs, which are based on
19th and 20th century technology. 1 2 It greatly improves consumer
access, at lower prices.233 What major labels know how to do well does
not match the needs of either musicians or consumers anymore.
Moreover, the mismatch is likely to get worse. As the labels respond
to shifts in demand to new formats and new distribution channels
they will respond by becoming more risk averse, and they will provide
fewer opportunities for new talent. This will cause new talent to put
aside dreams of being signed by a big label and push them toward
new architectures. As the major labels become identified in the minds
of consumers with a smaller and smaller subset of music they are
interested in, they will attach less credibility to major-label
sponsorship. The labels' efforts at copy protection and other efforts to
232. Schorr at 75.
233. Id. at 74-75.
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reduce illegitimate-and legitimate-competition will reduce
convenience of their products, similarly driving consumers to other
sources of music.
Better ways to manage search costs will continue to drive the
industry. As Chris Dahlen put it, "Artists can now let consumers and
their friends do the work of getting the word out." His comment
suggests that the wider availability of samples of new music will
intensify word of mouth. This suggests that demand can be increased
by giving music away. His comment also, however, exposes a
weakness in his vision: if consumers and their friends have too much
work to do to discover new music, they may not do it. Search costs in
the 21st century are still important. New tools are available to reduce
them: music blogs, reviews on pitchforkmedia.com, Pandora.com, and
file sharing. Soon services like iTunes will offer "we think you'd also
like..." just as amazon.com does today for books. In fact an
independent web-based service already does this. Pandora 2" allows a
consumer to list the songs she likes. The service analyzes musical
features of these songs and suggests others with similar features.
The following section explores management of search costs in
greater depth.
V. New Architectures
A. New Production and Distribution Channels
There are more than 325 licensed music downloading sites
worldwide (not counting thousands of MySpace pages), up from 50 in
2003.235 Five popular and large-scale services illustrate the types of
distribution now available for the popular music market, neither of
which relies on traditional intermediaries such as the major record
labels.
iTunes is an Internet-based virtual store maintained by Apple
Computer Company through which consumers can purchase music in
digital form to be played on Apple's iPod, a portable piece of
hardware, smaller than a deck of cards, capable of storing and playing
thousands of individual songs, depending on the model. Most major
performers and most popular music are available through iTunes.236
234. http://www.pandora.com/
235. Global Digital Music Sales Triple to US$1.1 Billion in 2005 as New Market Takes
Shape, http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/press/20060119.html (last visited April 1, 2006).
236. Miller, supra note 2, at 326 (reporting that iTunes offers 500,000 tracks licensed
from major labels and works from some 200 independent artists).
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Each song is priced at $0.99, with albums also available at prices
ranging from $6-16 dollars. Under current license deals, a record
company gets 65% of 99 cents and iTunes keeps 35% .z7 The artist
signed to a major label can expect 8-14 cents per song, after the label
takes its cut.
238
When one purchases a song from iTunes, one "owns it," but it
can be copied only to a limited number of computers and CDs, and its
format is incompatible with any player other than an iPod.
By the end of 2005, Apple's iTunes was number seven in the top
ten music retailers, according to independent market research. It had
a 70-80% market share of the downloaded music market.239 The
major labels were pressuring Apple to increase the price for more
popular singles and albums. 2"
Yahoo's Rhapsody works similar to iTunes, but the business
model is different. Rhapsody users can download an unlimited
number of songs from the Rhapsody library and play them for as long
as they make subscription payments to the Rhapsody music service."'
Rhapsody also offers the option to buy music files and to burn them
to CDs or to download them to portable players, including iPods
22
CD Baby 243  has been selling and distributing CDs for
independent musicians since 1998 and reports that it has paid more
than $4 million to artists. Anyone can list his music for distribution by
CD Baby by online registration, payment of a $35 membership fee,
and sending five CDs as an initial inventory.2 " CD Baby lists the new
music on its website, sends it to amazon.com, and pays royalties to the
artist monthly, taking only a 9% share of revenues.245CD Baby also
distributes music digitally, making it available to iTunes, Rhapsody,
and other commercial music sales outlets, although these other
outlets make their own decisions whether to carry the music. 246 At an
author's discretion, CD Baby also makes available MP3 file samples
237. Dina LaPolt, Taking a Glance at New Media Deals in the Music Industry,
http://www.musicbizacademy.com/articles/dl_newmedia.htm (reporting that Apple keeps
35 cents of the 99 cents charged for an iTunes sale)
238. Id.
239. http://www.macnewsworld.com/story/47525.html [visited 29 Dec. 2005]
240. Apple Was Pressured to Raise iTunes Pricing in 2006 (Dec. 9, 2005),







NEW ARCHITECrURES FOR MUSIC
of music it offers on its Web page for the particular author and
musical work.247
Amazon.com's "Advantage" program offers another distribution
and sales outlet. Artists and producers may be listed on Amazon by
sending a small number of CDs to Amazon, which then lists them in
its database which potential purchasers can browse. 4 8 Amazon
imposes slightly higher requirements with respect to packaging and
bar codes than CD Baby (CD Baby does not require bar codes, for
example).4 9 Amazon reserves a certain amount of discretion to refuse
music it deems unsuitable.
Disc Makers250  offers comprehensive mastering and CD
manufacturing services with a variety of pricing points. The basic
service provides 300 CDs with color silkscreen printing on the face of
the disc and color jewel-case inserts for $999. Reproduction of smaller
number of discs is available at lower prices. Disc Makers has
partnership with CD Baby, so a musician can sign up to use Disc
Maker services and at the same time list the music for sale and
distribution on CD Baby and, through CD Baby, on iTunes and the
other services.
MySpace represents an explosive new form of intermediation.
Focused on building social communities initiated by individual
subscribers, it has enabled heretofore unknown musicians to make
their music accessible to MySpace's 55 million users and to reach out
to networks of "friends" to build a fan base and to strengthen the
attachment of these friends to the musicians.
Startups like Snocap offer the possibility of pure intermediaries
who fuel internet supply chains for music by allowing artists to put
their songs in at one end and allowing retailers to get the music out at
the other end, with a seamless payment system for all participants."'
They professionalize the creaky but enormously popular MySpace, 2
which allows musicians to post their music for free thus increasing the
likelihood that others will find out about it. In September, 2006,
MySpace announced a partnership with Snocap, through which it
would sell music on MySpace. The serviceallows bands and labels of
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iTunes, which requires unsigned artists to go through a label or
distributor to place music on iTunes, Snocap allows any artist to
upload music and sign a contract online."s
eMusic is a subscription-based service that allows consumers to
own, not rent, their music in MP3 without DRM. eMusic concentrates
on music outside the commercial mainstream. However, it does
notwork directly with unsigned artists, who must work through a label
or an online music distributor such as The Orchard
(http://www.theorchard.com) which makes all its artists available on
eMusic. eMusic is the world's largest retailer of independent music
and the world's second-largest digital music retailer overall (after
iTunes).254
Free file sharing networks fueled much of the current
reassessment of the current industry structure. They are likely to
continue to exist in some form, although they now must compete with
"legitimate" file. acquisition networks such as those discussed in the
preceding paragraphs of this section.
Napster was an Internet-based network of music consumers who
could share their MP3 files by entering them into a centralized index.
The existence of the centralized index made it possible for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to find that the
administrators of the central index service were engaged in
contributory copyright infringement.25 '
After Napster was shut down, Grokster became popular. It was
thought to be less vulnerable to litigation by the music industry
because it had no central index. Participants in the network wishing to
share files with each other did so directly, without the need for a
central index. The industry sued the developers of the Grokster
software, and the Supreme Court, as explained in § 0, found that the
defendants could be liable for inducing infringement. Grokster was
acquired by Mashboxx, which then entered into an agreement with
Sony-BMG for legal distribution of Sony music at 99 cents per
download.256
253. Robert Levine, MySpace Music Store Is New Challenge for Big Labels, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006 at C3.
254. http://www.emusic.com.
255. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).
256. Mashboxx.com, Mashbox, the First P2P Authoized by Major Record Label,
Completes Licensing Deal with Sony BMG Entertainment,
http://www.mashboxx.com/release.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2005).
B. New Business Models
The interaction of supply and demand for music is determined
more by business models around which production is organized than
by law, although business models are, of course, influenced by
perception of law's rights and privileges2 "
Present business models typically focus predominantly on one
source of revenue, for example, concerts, and use other potential
sources of revenue, for example recorded music, primarily to support
the first sources. For example a band might give away CDs or MP3
files in order to build interest in planned concerts. Another band
might use concerts to build interest in purchases of CDs or MP3 files.
Neither band would necessarily give away either performances or
recordings, but it would either give some away or price each so as to
maximize demand for the combination. In other words, rational music
suppliers price complementary and substitute products they control
so as to maximize the complementarity and to minimize the
substitution.
As technology makes it more difficult to control the distribution
of recorded music, limiting distribution only to those who have paid
for it, one effect may be to shift performer preferences toward the
first business model, the one that emphasizes revenue from live
concerts. The changes in technology may make it more difficult for
owners of the underlying musical work to collect revenues for
performances of recorded music, but nothing about the technology
should make it more difficult to collect revenues for large public
performances. They will continue to be as visible and therefore as
susceptible to enforcement of performance rights as in the past.
For songwriters and some performers the revenue stream for
performance rights in the underlying musical work will continue to be
more important than the revenue stream from other elements in the
bundle of rights owned by different participants in the marketplace
257. Cf Schorr, supra note 90 (reviewing factors contributing to decline of major
record labels and evaluating four online business models for major labels); Jeff Leeds,
Korn Sells a Stake in Itself, N.Y.TIMEs, Jan. 11, 2006, at B1 (reporting that hard-rock band
Korn is promoting new album by unusual deal with Live Nation, Inc. concert promoter
that gives concert promoter 6% interests in band's box office, licensing, publishing,
merchandise and CD revenue for an album, in exchange for $3 million cash payment;
suggesting new business model in which all revenues go into a single "pot" and various
participants, such as record producers and artists get a percentage share, replacing
separate bilateral deals); Jeff Leeds, As Pop Music Seeks New Sales, the Pussycat Dolls
Head to Toyland, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at C1 (reporting on trend for record labels to
market dolls, cosmetics lines, and other merchandise as a part of a portfolio from which
they get revenue and artists get royalties).
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for music. Mechanical royalties for owners of the underlying rights of
the musical work may be more difficult to collect because the
technology widely disburses the capability of producing new
mechanical recordings, while, at the same time making mechanical
recordings less important, compared to digital music files as a
medium for exchanging music.
1. Two Case Studies
Two case studies illustrate how real musicians plan to use new
technologies to build or maintain sustainable business models for
creating music and connecting with consumers. In both cases, the
capacity of new technologies to expose new potential audiences to
their music is crucial to the business model. But the two artists, Dick
Prall and Tim Sandusky, have very different concepts of how to use
the technology. Prall intends to follow the tradition of emphasizing
live performances. Sandusky intends to be a pioneer with a new
philosophy of artistic creation and fan engagement.
a. Dick Prall
Dick Prall is a 37-year old Chicago singer/songwriter who has
been performing professionally since he was 23. He released his first
album when he was 28 and was a full-time musician for four years
thereafter. For the last five years, he has worked full-time in various
administrative and professional jobs while playing music part-time.
Now he contemplates quitting his "day job" to resume performing,
playing and singing full time. During his first full-time period, he
experienced considerable success, opening for major groups before
audiences of 1,500 to 7,000, getting some 50 mostly favorable reviews,
selling 4,000 copies of his first album and 3,000 copies of a second. He
did live performances 12-15 times a month as the lead in a band he
called "Starch Martins." A vanity label called WhiteRose Recordings
served as a conduit for investors and donors to defray recording-
studio and touring expenses, in the aggregate sum of $40,000. Despite
these apparent indicia of success, Prall only made about $50 per
week-hardly enough to support himself and his daughter. His most
enthusiastic supporter and manager, Fred Haumesser , had a full time
job and had only limited amounts of time to provide management for
the band. No one else in Prall's base of friends and fans had the time
to connect all the dots-to make sure that he captured the synergy
that might have developed from the favorable reviews, the fan
support, and the CD sales, which occurred at different times in
different places.
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Since he has been working fulltime outside the music industry, he
continues to perform live four to six times per month, and has
released a third album, which has sold 1500 copies so far. He has a
well constructed website, on which one can listen to samples of his
music, see the upcoming calendar of performances, and order CDs.
His music is available for sale on CDBaby, AwareStore, Miles of
Music, Not Lame Recording Company, iTunes, and Amazon. He
wrote six new songs in 2006, and he has 6,906 MySpace "friends" as of
September 21, 2006." He makes $400-$1000 per month on his music,
mostly from live performance revenues.
Now, Prall plans to become a fulltime musician again. When the
setting requires it, he will arrange for others to join him, on a
performance-by-performance basis, but the brand will always be
"Dick Prall." He has hired a professional manager, who intends to
concentrate on expanding his public performances and disdains the
usual record-label deal, which "leaves the artist with nothing but debt
to the label., 259 He will put off releasing another album until someone
is willing to front the costs. Prall hopes to alternate two-week touring
periods, with one week off in between, throughout the year,
averaging fifteen performances per month. He expects to earn $50-
$500 per performance, with $500-$1000 from college performances.
He will write new songs while he is on the road. His hope is that his
popularity will increase, which will increase live performance
opportunities and attendance and drive CD, download and
merchandise sales. Success would be defined as earning $50,000 per
year. He expects that the revenue split would be 50% from live
performances, 20% from CD sales-mostly at performances, 10%
from sales of merchandise such as T-shirts, posters and coffee mugs,
and another 20% from download sales. The margin is highest on CD
sales ($6 per CD) and merchandise.
"I am a musician," Prall says, "and I want to make a living
pursuing my passion. I'm not going to give up. When people hear my
music, they like it and want to hear more.''26
"It's different now," he believes, "than when I was 30. You don't
have to print and assemble the press packets; they are already in an
electronic bundle on your hard drive, and you just click the mouse
button once to send it to a hundred promoters, venue owners or
reviewers. You don't have to recruit a network of people to give out
258. Interviews with Dick Prall, (Sep. 2006-Mar. 2007).
259. Id.
260. Id.
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CDs to draw people to the next performance; you just pull them to
your MySpace site or webpage and they can sample your music and
see what you look like and get acquainted and join your club from
wherever they are. Nor does it matter where my manager is
physically. She can reach out to promoters and venues all over the
country from her home office. She can get my input on scheduling
without our having to have a meeting." '261
With the aid of new technologies for broadening awareness,
building fan-artist attachment through virtual communication, Prall
believes that he can gradually increase attendance at his live
performances, producing enough income to survive and to live a
modestly comfortable life, one in which he has quality time for his
daughter and his partner.
Prall is undaunted by any concern that some music consumers
prefer younger singers. "Occasionally, a 15-year old girl may lose
interest when she discovers I am 37 rather than 25, but my music has
a broader appeal than 15-year-old girls who fantasize about a
romantic relationship."
' 262
"Of course," good-looking, charismatic Prall says with a smile, "I
don't mind that I look younger than I am.
263
b. Oucho Sparks
Tim Sandusky, 26, is the lead singer and manager of a Chicago
Indie rock group called "Oucho Sparks" and the proprietor of Studio
Ballistico, a recording studio. The band, with varying membership,
has been performing since 1998, when Sandusky was 18, and aims its
music at high-school and college age consumers. It has released two
albums, the first of which sold 700 copies. The second album, released
in September 2006, sold 60 CDs and 20 downloadable versions in the
first week. The band alternates between focusing on live performance
and on recording, and is deliberate in setting the schedule for creating
new songs and releasing them.
Sandusky has designed the band and is business model to
accommodate multiple involvements by its eight members: Sandusky
himself, Jamie Gallaher (drums), who also is a member of Andreas
Kapsalis Trio and teaches music; Laura Grey (backup vocals), who
tours with the Second City comedy troup; Dave Bowers (guitar);
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(bass); and Ryan "Catfish" Chindlund (live producer and
percussionist). Oucho Sparks relies mainly on its own website and on
MySpace to promote and distribute its music, disdaining
intermediaries such as record labels, CDBaby, Amazon or iTunes.
Oucho Sparks has 38,562 MySpace "friends."
His experience recording other artists and bands causes
Sandusky to conclude that "It's really hard to make money by playing
music. People want to be stars all of a sudden because they are too
lazy to do music in a serious way over a sustained period of time. The
more they try to 'make it,' the more they're digging a hole for
themselves-either through bad financial deals with record labels or
because of disappointed expectations, or both. Even for the few that
make it big, rarely do they have significant income for more than 3-5
years. Popular music stars are shooting stars."
He has a different philosophy, one the other band members
share:
There's more to playing music than making money off of it. If I want to
make money from music, I should write popular songs and recruit a
really attractive young singer to sing them and an investor to finance
marketing and promotion. That's not what I want to do.
Sandusky and the others would be happy if they get enough revenue
to cover their costs, plus a little.
For Oucho Sparks, the objectives are to write and play good
music, to become well known and respected, and to make a living.
Different members would rank these objectives differently, and
Sandusky is determined to maintain a mode of operating that helps
each band member fulfill his or her own goals according to his or her
own priorities. That means flexibility in scheduling practice sessions,
minimizing "democratic" discussions of business policy and artistic
direction, and reliance on Sandusky to be the manager and the
linchpin who keeps each member involved through frequent one-to-
one communication. It's not a significant setback when Grey is
unavailable for a period because she is on tour with Second City or
Jamie Gallaher is on a three-month tour with Andreas Kapsalis Trio.
Despite their other involvements, each band member finds the Oucho
Sparks philosophy credible and believes that the group can help each
performer fulfil his or her goals for music. They always make time
available for their Oucho Sparks obligations.
"For a modern musician to make a living, you have to be diverse:
you perform live; you record; you give lessons; you produce; you
work as a webmaster; you promote MySpace exposure; you do
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interviews; you may have a job in a completely different field,"
Sandusky says. This defines the Oucho Sparks philosophy for its
performers.
The business model reflects Sandusky's understanding of how
the demand for music has changed. The forces that skewed demand
to a handful of music superstars have shifted to a broader set of music
creators. It has become easier to be "medium big"-to have 1,000
loyal fans; it is harder to be Red Hot Chili Peppers. The skew to the
top may remain for pop, rap, hip-hop, but not for rock. There no
longer is such a thing as the top 40 for rock music. And being signed
with a record label does not matter any more. Everyone has a label,
and the consumers don't know the difference; they want to find music
they like, and its easier to find it by ignoring the big labels. "We've
had 80,000 plays of our music-that means that someone listened to
some of our music for at least a second or two 80,000 times. It would
have cost a fortune to achieve that twenty years ago," Sandusky says,
and you could not have done it without a major label's validation
and marketing and distribution resources. Now it costs very little
with downloading websites and MySpace. The club and old boys
network that the industry stalwarts provide is largely irrelevant
now; we can form our own club through MySpace. The major labels
are just investors, and we can get better terms from a bank.
Moreover, according to Sandusky, it is not just a matter of
splitting existing market share differently. The total demand for music
has increased dramatically because music has become more portable
through the combination of downloading digital files and portable
music players such as iPod.
Now consumers can use more of their work, leisure, and
travel time, listening to music, often doing something else at the
same time." Before the advent of the new technologies, you could
enjoy music only during blocks of leisure time; now you can listen
to it during all the time you are awake-if you want to.
The result is more opportunities for more musicians to sustain
music long-term music careers, even though prices have fallen and
will continue to fall.26
264. Interview with Tim Sandusky, (Sep. 22, 2006).
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C. Other Possibilities
Beyond the Prall and Sandusky visions, more dramatic shifts in
business models are conceivable. One thoughtful student note
identifies four new business models for the music marketplace that
take advantage of new technologies: the "online tip-jar," the
"advertising-shipping" model, the "commercial" model, and the
"digital rights management" model.16' These do not exhaust the
possibilities, but they are illustrative of new possibilities.
The online tip-jar model would function much as the shareware
model for computer software;266 consumers would voluntarily
contribute to artists whose music they like. 6 Experience suggests that
it would not work, because most consumers would not contribute.
The advertising-shipping model would induce consumers to place
orders for CDs and other physical formats (and, by implication, from
downloadable songs and albums) on websites that contain
advertisements and samples of available music." The commercial
model would embed advertising in music embodied in CDs and other
physical formats or delivered through the Internet and available to
consumers without charge. The DRM model would alleviate industry
concerns about piracy but would entrench restrictions on supply
presently exercised by major labels. 69
Ultimately, the note concludes,
Perhaps the inevitable solution is the dissolution of the major-labels....
[T]hese companies are not healthy, and they are inefficient. The labels
are out of touch; they are bulky and sluggish, and their primary tactic
to date has been to delay the development of music services online. It
is possible that they have dug their own grave. "o
It also may be, however, that the major labels would embrace
new business models for their own roles. The core of what they have
done in the past is to mediate advertising and distribution. Because
the ways they have advertised and distributed in the past are
265. Schorr, supra note 257, at 89-109.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. This model fails to take advantage of the Internet's capacity to reduce
distribution costs associated with manufacturing, stockpiling, and shipping physical
formats.
269. Schorr, supra note 257, at 109 (concluding that advertising-shipping and
commercial models are more attractive than other two models).
270. Id. at 110.
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becoming unnecessary, they could look at new forms of advertising
and distribution enabled by new technologies. Rather than having
their recorded music be distributed by iTunes, they could organize
Web-based downloading sites of their own. Then they could compete
with one another based on the scope of their catalog of available
music, the user-friendliness of their websites and the convenience
with which downloaded music could be transferred to iPod-like
players. Why Sony-BMG rather than Apple was not the first to
organize a site like iTunes presents an interesting question. The
probable answers are, first, that Sony-BMG, unlike Apple, was so
preoccupied with threats to its old business model that it was
inhibited from innovating with a new business model. It saw MP3 files
and Internet downloading as a threat rather than an opportunity. It
also may be that Apple is good at designing products for computer
and Internet enthusiasts and Sony-BMG is not, having no experience
in that field.271
A dramatic shift to completely different business models such as
the tip-jar or advertising models is unlikely. Some music will be
available for free, either because the singer wants it that way or
because he has no choice once one copy is available to someone with
access to the Internet. Far more likely that wholesale embrace of new
business models is that most consumers will continue to pay for most
of the music they consume, but they will pay $0.99 for a song instead
of $18 for an CD album, and they will buy their MP3 files through
iTunes, Rhapsody, and MySpace/Snocap; and their CDs through
CDBaby and Amazon rather than through Tower Records and
Borders. Musicians like Prall and Sandusky will adapt their
expectations and practices to the new marketplace more rapidly than
entrench intermediaries and will flourish.
VI. Role of Copyright Law
This article argues that the new technologies under attack by the
music industry increase the supply of, and demand for, music, while
reducing the risks of free riding. Accordingly the need for copyright
law to intrude into the marketplace to mitigate the risk of free riding
is reduced; not increased; in other words, the scope of music copyright
should be narrowed, not broadened. Nevertheless, some risk of free
riding remains, and its potential to damage legitimate interests and
271. Accepting that inference would require distinguishing the music part of Sony
from the computer products part. Sony is very good as designing notebook and desktop
PCs and digital cameras.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [29.3
the incentives to create, produce and distribute new music by large
scale piracy remain. Remedies often matter more than rights in law. If
it costs more to enforce a right than the right is worth; the law does
not add much value by recognizing the right. While the copying
incident to music file sharing is prima-facie infringement, the
transaction costs of enforcing copyrights against every individual
engaging in file sharing are enormous."
Twenty years ago Ithiel De Sola Pool suggested that
technological bottlenecks always will be natural focal points in
intellectual-property regimes.2 73 Thus the concentration of music
rights holders litigation on ISPs, peer-to-peer file-sharing hosts using
Napster and similar technologies and the writers and distributors of
file sharing software employing Grokster and similar technologies is
not surprising.
The appropriate public policy debate that is needed is not how to
strike fear into the hearts of computer programmers working on new
file dissemination techniques and on teenagers burning discs for each
other, but how to tailor copyright law to the real problems of the
future, instead of using it to slow down technological innovation.
If intellectual property law needs to be tweaked, the reform
initiative should aim at getting the balance right so that resources
allocated for the production and consumption of music are optimal
from a societal standpoint, the tweaking also should focus copyright
law on activities that truly have the potential to undermine incentives
to create music. The law needs to clarify privileges for certain types of
music consumption that no longer represent appreciable risks to the
legitimate expectations of music performers.
Moreover, anyone who would redesign intellectual property law
should focus not on the business models of the major record labels
and recording studios, but instead on the new business models
represented by MySapce, iTunes, Rhapsody, Google, CDBaby,
Pandora and Snocap, and consider what, if anything, the law needs to
do to protect the legitimate expectations of those who would invest in
272. See In re Charter Communications, Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d
771 (8th Cir. 2005) (vacating subpoena compelling ISP to disclose identities of subscribers
who were using peer-to-peer music file sharing services); Elektra Entertainment Group,
Inc. v. Does 1-9, No. 04 Civ. 2289 (RWS), 2004 WL 2095581 (S.D. N.Y. Sep. 8, 2004)
(discussing difficulties encountered by plaintiff music copyright holder in ascertaining the
identities of individuals engaging in music file sharing); Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. v.
Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (enforcing subpoena to compel ISP to
identify individual defendants accused of downloading music).
273. See Ithiel de Sola Pool, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 248-50 (Belknap Press,
1983).
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these new technologies. It must encourage the design and erection of
these new marketplaces within which search costs-one of the
originally important categories of transaction costs in music
economics-are substantially lower than in older market
configurations.
Such an assessment necessarily considers the fact that music and
other hedonic goods 7' closely related to music can be produced in
many forms. A market economy should consider potential producers
and consumers to decide what packages of related goods and services
they want to exchange. If a performer wants to give away CDs or
downloadable files to increase attendance at paid performances
where t-shirts are sold at inflated prices, and if consumers want to pay
for that bargain, the law should not impede their flexibility to do so.
A. Maximizing Social Benefits Through Law
Economists differ on whether copyright protection is socially
beneficial or not.275 Whether it enhances society depends on whether
it reduces transaction costs more than it increases them. As earlier
sections of this article explain, copyright law is justified as necessary
to reduce transaction costs of free riding, which otherwise would
greatly reduce the economic incentives to create, produce, and
distribute music. Some musicians assert that the law should promote
file sharing.276
The central thesis of this article is that, because technology has
reduced the free riding risk, the scope of copyright should be
narrowed, not broadened. The second argument developed by this
article is that new technologies increase the demand for music. Here
is where copyright law may increase transaction costs, if it makes it
more difficult for new technologies to be widely deployed and used to
enable sellers and purchasers to find each other and make whatever
deals they would like to make.
274. A "hedonic good" is one that satisfies primarily non-monetary desires.
275. See Princeton Study, supra note 25, at 52 (citing economists reaching opposing
conclusions).
276. See Damian Kulash, Jr., Buy, Play, Trade, Repeat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2005, at
A31 (op-ed by lead singer for OK Go, arguing that "It's much better to have copies of
albums on iPods, even if only half of them have been paid for, than to have a few CDs
sitting on a shelf and not being played;" copy protection insults consumers, inconveniences
them, and encourages them to engage in illegal file sharing; "As for musicians, we are left
to wonder how many more people could be listening to our music if it weren't such a
hassle and how many more iPods might have our albums on them if our labels hadn't
sabotaged our releases with cumbersome software");
f[29.3
Major transaction costs include free-riding, search-costs,
detection, and enforcement by rights holders. The Internet may have
reduced search costs, but lowered barriers to entry increase the
supply of music. The quantity of music available over the Internet
may overwhelm search technologies, leaving search costs as an
important externality. Detection and enforcement costs remain
significant.
Conclusions differ on the overall effect of file sharing on
different sectors of the music industry. Some economists conclude
that social welfare is increased, with less-known musicians benefiting
the most, at the expense of intermediaries and superstars. Others, of
course, conclude that social welfare is diminished.277
Copyright law in the new marketplace for music should make it
easier for undiscovered musicians to reach out to potential
consumers. It should allow potential consumers to sample artists they
do not know. In other words, copyright law should promote file sales
and file sharing. It should do nothing to increase transaction costs by
encouraging cumbersome DRM copy-protection schemes.
A number of commentators advocate reforming copyright law to
encourage peer-to-peer file sharing,2 78 and others propose more
fundamental reform.2 79 Too many are enamored by DRM, and more
pervasive regulation and taxation of music.
277. Princeton Study, supra note 25, at 60-61 (reviewing studies). See Alejandro
Zentner, Measuring the Effect of Music Downloads on Music Purchases (First Draft June
2003), http://home.uchicago.edu/-alezentn/musicindustrynew.pdf (last visited June 16,
2005) (estimating that without file sharing 2002 recorded music sales would have been
7.8% higher); Stan J. Liebowitz, (2003b), Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems
with a Compulsory License, Unpublished paper (School of Management, University of
Texas at Dallas), available at http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/intprop/complpff.pdf; Stan
J. Liebowitz, (2004a),, Unpublished paper (School of Management, University of Texas at
Dallas); Stan J. Liebowitz, (2004b), Pitfalls in Measuring the Impact of File sharing,
Unpublished paper (School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas), available at
http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/intprop/pitfalls.pdf.
278. See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter "Litman"] (arguing that copyright law should encourage music file sharing so
that the information space for music would resemble the space for collaboration that has
developed for other types of information in the Internet). Id. at 38 (summarizing proposals
by Netanel, Fisher, Ku, Lunney, Gervais and Lessig).
279. See Miller at 323 (identifying as options: voluntary collective licensing,
compulsory licensing, ad revenue sharing, P2P subscriptions, bandwidth levies imposed on
ISPs, media tariffs on blank CDs, maintaining status quo). Id. at 324-325 (noting that
compulsory licensing has been imposed with respect to player piano, satellite televisions,
cable television, and Internet radio).
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Harvard professor William W. Fisher III, in his book, Promises
to Keep,' meticulously outlines the current status of the music
industry and provides good data on the cost structure of music
production and delivery in the world of CDs. He is balanced and
objective in his analysis of the interests of the participants in the
music industry, and stresses the institutional arrangements developed
for a different technological environment. He reviews several
approaches for reform and ultimately prefers a system in which
creators of music would register their works with the copyright office,
resulting in a unique file name which would be used to track digital
copies of the work. Public revenues would subsidize those who
register to make their works available to the public, based on
techniques pioneered by performing rights organizations. A
government agency would collect data and estimate the frequency
with which each work is heard by consumers, and registrants would
be paid a share of the available revenues in proportion to the relative
popularity of each work. Once such a system was in place, Fisher
would repeal most of the current prohibitions in copyright law on
unauthorized reproduction, distribution, adaptation, and
performance. The result would be that most music would be available
for free."'
Lawrence Lessig, in his book Free Culture,m explains how
extensions of copyright law and computer architectures have
combined with concentration in the communication and
entertainment industries to narrow the scope of public domain music
and other information available for creative effort. Not only does a
creator confront a world in which her building blocks are more
encumbered than ever with property interests, she confronts a nearly
insuperable set of transaction costs if she tries to get permission from
all the rights holders in order to build on their works. 3 Lessig
explains that fair use, while theoretically at least a partial answer to
some of these problems is not a good answer because it is so
280. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004).
281. Fisher, supra note 280 at 202.
282. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF
CREATIVITY (2004).
283. Idat 95-97 (story of frustration in trying to get permission to use a short segment
of "The Simpsons" in the background of a documentary); Id. at 100-103 (story of Alex
Alban's efforts to clear rights for segments to be used in a new video mosaic).
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expensive to defend a copyright infringement lawsuit and the
penalties for losing are so great.
Lessig offers five reform proposals. First, he suggests more
formalities to obtain and to keep a copyright in force.285 He suggests a
model for copyright registration similar to that used to register
Internet domain names.2' He also suggests a standard for marking
files to distinguish that which is free from that which permission must
be obtained.8 7 He suggests shortening the term for copyright to the
1976 average of about 32 years.2 8 He suggests narrowing the exclusive
rights of copyright owners by limiting the right to create derivative
works to a much shorter term than the underlying copyright and mark
specific derivative uses that are protected, leaving others
unprotected. 9 He suggests particular reforms with respect to music
file sharing so that the law focuses narrowly on those who use file
sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing copyrighted music.
Lessig privileges those who use sharing networks for three further
purposes: (1) to sample before purchasing it; (2) to obtain access to
content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright; and (3) for
those who are using the networks to get access to content that is not
copyrighted or access that the rights holder explicitly or impliedly
approves. 290 As to works no longer available, Lessig suggests a
statutory license that would establish a low statutory licensing rate for
the commercial sharing of content not offered for sale by a
commercial publisher, while creating an incentive to keep works
available commercially by exempting them from the statutory
license.29' He suggests a modification of William Fisher's proposal.
While Fisher offers a proposal to replace the current copyright
system, Lessig would have it complement the existing system.292
Lessig would tax and compensate for file sharing that replaces sales if
actual harm is demonstrated.293 Finally, he would "fire all the lawyers"
294by simplifying the copyright legal regime.
284. Id. at 98-99.
285. Id. at 287.
286. Id. at 289.
287. Id. at 291.
288. Id. at 293.
289. Id. at 295.
290. Id. at 296-297. Lessig does not suggest that this would be feasible to make such a
distinction with any proposed distribution system, but rather, articulates it as a goal.
291. Id. at 299-300.
292. Id. at 301.
293. Id. at 303. This resembles the Canadian Canadian Copyright Board's CD tax
system. See http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/tariffs/proposed/c25022006-b.pdf. In addition, France
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Litman proposes legislation to permit consumer downloads of
music and collective licenses to pay for them. 5 She proposes a
blanket license for widespread file sharing. The terms of the license
would be statutory, but copyright owners could opt out. Opting out
would be intentionally burdensome in order to encourage file sharing.
Rights holders who wish to opt out for the statutory licensing system
must use a special file format she calls ".drm" to give notice that the
music contained in the file is copyrighted and not licensed for
sharing.29 The ".drm" format could include copyright rights
management data as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 1202. Royalties would be
administered by a government agency because empirical evidence
shows that private copyright collectives disadvantage, and possibly
cheat, small artists.297 Individual artists would have rights enforceable
against the licensees and the royalty agencies.298 Through this scheme,
Litman envisions a space in which "free" music could coexist with
paid-for music, just as paid information and news sites on the Internet
coexist with free sites.2" Her proposal includes some attractive
incentives, including the requirement that a copyright holder
demonstrate that it released files in other than the ".drm" format in
order to be entitled to statutory royalties.
Professor Neil Netanel suggests the imposition of a tax to
mitigate the effects of free peer-to-peer file sharing.' He
acknowledges arguments in favor of the benefits of free peer to peer
file sharing to artistic creativity, but concludes that "untrammeled
P2P file swapping could eviscerate the economic incentive for
has a copyright levy on nearly everything that can be used for private copying, and
Germany imposes a copyright levy on personal computers.
294. Id. at 304-305.
295. Litman, supra note 278 at 39 (encouraging mobilization of 60 million people who
share music files to balance political power of entrenched lobbying power of recording
industry).
296. Litman, supra note 278 at 49 ("With the exception of works released only in the
.drm format, consumer-to-consumer dissemination and any reproduction, distribution or
public performance of display that it entailed, would be completely legal. Any music that's
already been released in other formats could be recaptured only with great
difficulty .... ) (emphasis added),
297. Litman, supra note 278 at 42 "[Rloyalty collectives may sometimes be better at
collecting money than disbursing it". Ethics in the music industry generally are not
admirable . See Jeff Leeds, Spitzer Sues Radio Chain As Part of Music Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at C4 (reporting on accusations that radio chain solicited payments
from record companies in exchange for playing songs on the air).
298. Litman, supra note 278 at 43.
299. Id. at 45.
300. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-
to-Peer File Sharing, 17 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1 (2003).
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creating many types of valuable works." 3 ' He recommends a
"noncommercial use levy" tax on the sale of consumer products or
services whose value is substantially enhanced by P2P file sharing.
These products and services include Internet access, P2P software and
services; computer hardware; CD burners; MP3 players; digital video
recorders; blank CDs. The statutory enactments imposing the tax
would afford copyright immunity for "noncommercial copying and
distribution of any expressive content that the copyright owner has
previously released to the public." "03Noncommercial derivative works
would also be non-infringing as long as the second creator identifies
the underlying work and indicates the enhancements.' The revenues
collected would be distributed to copyright holders for revenues lost
due to P2P file sharing, which Netanel estimates as amounting to
some 4% of the retail price of P2P goods and services.3 5 Tax proceeds
would be allocated in proportion to the popularity of their works. and
of derivative works, as measured by digital tracking and sampling
technologies."' He would piggyback his taxation scheme and revenue
distribution proposals on the rulemaking and arbitration proceedings
regarding levees and compulsory licenses under existing copyright
law. 3°7
Professor Glynn Lunney proposes reforms aimed at
strengthening the privileges of users of copyrighted material whose
interests otherwise were largely extinguished by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).& He criticizes tax-based
approaches such as those subsequently proposed by Netanel. First,
the technologies that would be subject to the tax have uses other than
private copying of copyrighted materials, yet the tax would be
generally borne.' Second, a tax would discourage the creation and
dissemination of new distribution technologies. 310 Third, copyright
301. Id. at 3-4.
302. Id. at 4. Weinstock defines noncommercial use as any transmission or receipt of
works in digital format over P2P file swapping networks not involving the(l) sale of copies
of copyrighted works; (2) access to copyrighted works; or (3)advertising in connection to
the copyrighted work or any derivative thereof. Id. at 42-43.
303 Netanel, supra note 275, at 4.
304. Id. at 4 (summarizing proposal).
305. Id. at 4.
306. Id. at 4.
307. Id. at 44-45.
308. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VAND.. L. REV. 813 (2001).
309. Id. at 855-856.
310. Id. at 856-857.
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owners would oppose such a scheme because it would legitimate
private copying and limit their ability to engage in price
discrimination and otherwise to price their works as they see fit.3 '
Instead, he suggests that an honor system might be more effective
than many people think. 2 Generally, he observes that civil
disobedience will limit the effect of more stringent legal protections
advocated by the existing industry.
This article draws on some of these ideas, while rejecting most of
the proposed solutions. It would privilege most consumer-to-
consumer file sharing; it recognizes the social utility of civil
disobedience. It is skeptical about grand reform proposals based on
use taxes, both because of the risk of unintended consequences and
because of the risk of capture of the legislative process by entrenched
protectors of the status quo.
The law should distinguish between informal free-file sharing,
which improves the functioning of the market, and piracy, which
should be redefined as charging money for someone else's music. The
best direction for copyright reform would create an express privilege
for exchanging recorded music among friends and maybe for any non-
profit public distribution. 4 As with current versions of the fair use
privilege, the burden would be on the one asserting the privilege to
prove its applicability. A college sophomore accused of copyright
infringement by a music rights holder could escape liability by
offering evidence that he only exchanged files with twelve people: his
sister, four of his high school classmates and five of his fraternity
brothers. The rights holders, knowing that the privilege exists, would
not sue the sophomore in the first place unless they were confident
they could prove more widespread sharing or charging a fee for the
sharing.
This approach offers several advantages. It would conform the
law to reality, eliminating the undesirable result of making millions of
(mostly) young people outlaws. It would encourage the kind of social
intercourse with respect to music that would promote discovery of
new artists and according to the Oberholzer-Gee/Strumpf study,.. 5
311. Id. at 857-858.
312. Id. at 862-863.
313. Id. at 909.
314. The author credits his former student Andrew T. Strong for persuading the
initially skeptical author that this is the best direction for reform.
315. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record
Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. Political Econ'y 1 (2007),
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharing-June2005-final.pdf; Playlist at 214
well might increase sales of physical formats or downloads through
services such as iTunes. It also would mitigate the risk of increased
free-riding by permitting enforcement and litigation resources to be
focused on the real free-riding culprits-those who seek profit from
free riding on another's creative effort.
Such a reform could be implemented in two ways. First Congress
could amend section 107 of the Copyright Act31"6 to allow copying of
music for personal use and for exchange among friends as long as the
exchange is free; maybe to allow Web publishing and other forms of
free downloading as long as it is free. Such an approach is certainly
within Congressional capability to enact. For example, non-public
performances of musical works "without any purpose of direct or
indirect commercial advantage and without payment of any fee or
other compensation for the performance to any of its performers,
promoters, or organizers," are, subject to certain limitations, already
expressly privileged.317 Moreover, Canadian law permits file sharing in
a broader set of circumstances than privileged by U.S. law.
318
A second way is to interpret the existing text of section 107 to
privilege the same kind of informal file sharing, on the grounds that
the most important factor in fair use analysis is impact on the market
for the protected work, and the evidence suggests that informal file
sharing increases demand for copyrighted music and music recordings
rather than reducing it.
It is desirable to adopt the Lessig and Fisher ideas of providing
incentives to improve the transparency of existing ownership of
music, by requiring rights holders to support a national database of
claimed rights that is easy for musicians and new intermediaries to
access. Entries in the database for a certain period of years could be
made a prerequisite for filing suit, much as existing copyright law
requires registration and deposition of a work with the Copyright
Office as a pre-requisite for recovering damages or attorneys feed for
infringement.319 Reformers should be wary of wholesale embrace of
DRM schemes because they increase transaction costs for consumers
and create barriers to entry for small suppliers.
(reporting on independent study showing that free file exchange did not diminish sales of
recorded music and might have increased it).
316. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (recognizing common-law fair-use privilege) (2007).
317. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2007).
318. Litman, supra note 278 at 34 & n.129 (citing BMG Canada v. Doe [2004] F.C. 88
(Can.)); Miller, supra note 131 at 316 & n.95 (describing Canadian law as permitting file-
sharing).
319. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2007).
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B. Politics of Reform
The reality of legislative process when it comes to music and
other forms of entertainment is that the interests considered by
legislators are skewed. The entertainment industry enjoys enormous
clout on Capitol Hill because it is a generous contributor to election
campaigns, to Democrats as well as Republicans-perhaps more to
Democrats. That means it gets what it wants, except in those
circumstances in which it is opposed by an equally well organized and
well heeled lobby, such as the broadcasting industry or the telephone
industry. Dan Hunter observed that "[W]ithout muscular social
welfarist protection of the public domain, intellectual property
industries will never voluntarily reduce their expansionary claims....
We simply cannot expect those who are granted property interests to
reduce their entitlements to accord with social policy." 320To some
extent the producers of hardware, software and services related to the
Internet may represent an effective counterpoise to music industry
power in the future, but so far, the music industry has been much
better organized than the "Internet industry."
Another factor is the potential power of aroused consumers, who
can get the attention of legislators, when they are sufficiently aroused,
as they were in the recent uproar over certain copy protection
technologies deployed by Sony-BMG.3 21 "For the better part of three
hundred years they have expanded their empires, only to find that
their encroachment on the public domain has finally generated the
kind of proletarian backlash from the have-nots that threatens to
undermine all that they've work for."322
Monopolists always try to generate monopoly profits by
restricting output, i.e. by withholding product from the most efficient
channels. In the years to come, the music industry intermediaries,
exemplified by the major labels, will continue to do everything they
can to delay and frustrate deployment of new music technologies
because these technologies represent lower-cost competition by
legitimate artists and new kinds of intermediaries. It's not piracy they
are really afraid of; it is creative entrepreneurship by artists and their
supporters. 323
320. Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX.L.REV. 1105, 1120 (2005) [hereinafter
"Hunter"].
321. See note 200, supra.
322. Id. at 1119.
323. Schorr, supra note 257 at 74-75 (adherence to major label business models is
motivated by desire to avoid competing with small record labels on a national level, and
desire to continue to benefit from share of revenue for distribution expenditures).
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Some commentators have crafted their reform proposals to
achieve political support among the more powerful interest groups."'
The reality is, however, that once the legislative process is put in
motion, those most skilled at influencing it are likely to get most of
what they want. A member of the Senate or House might introduce a
bill that reflects a balanced compromise and the law that gets enacted
could enhance copyright protection for music, while doing little or
nothing to privilege socially useful file sharing. The legislative
approach is dangerous.
C. Legitimating Reform Under Current Fair-Use Law
The fair-use privilege provides legal justification for some
conduct that constitutes prima facie copyright infringement.
Theoretically, the common law of fair use could accommodate the
beneficial behaviors that define the new marketplace-including file
sharing. Reliance on existing fair-use concepts would obviate the risks
of the legislative process. Developed by the courts, the basic
principles of fair use are now codified in section 107 Copyright Act:325
"Notwithstanding the provisions of sections
106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by
that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-
"(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; and
324. See Litman, supra note 278 at 39 (explaining why elements of her proposal could
attract support from music, recording, computer, and consumer electronic industries to
"have a fair chance of enactment").
325. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2007).
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"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
"The fact that a work is unpublished shall not
itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made
upon consideration of all the above factors.,
32 6
The first and fourth factors favor non-commercial music file
sharers; the second and third factors favor the copyright holder
accusing such a file sharer of infringement.
32 7
Circuit Judge Posner, widely regarded as conservative and
business-oriented, emphasized the flexibility of the Fair-Use doctrine
in a 2004 law review article,3" suggesting its use to mitigate the
adverse effects of legislation upheld by the Supreme Court in the
Eldred decision that extended the term of the copyright.32 9 His article
begins by explaining fundamental differences between intellectual
property and physical property, including greater difficulty in
negotiating for a right to use intellectual property,330 and the fact that
use of another's intellectual property does not interfere with the
owner's use of it."' In this respect the non-rival characteristic of
intellectual property benefits the owner.
The article emphasizes the "open-ended" nature of the fair use
privilege, which was judicially created and codified by statutory
factors that are "expressly illustrative rather than controlling.
33 2
Moreover, the article expresses concern that some judges are inclined
"to view their role in the copyright system as enforcers of any claims
copyright owners bring, no matter how extravagant the claim and
how beneficial the unauthorized copying., 3 3 "Recognition that the
public benefits from certain unlicensed uses is essential and should be
acknowledged, not rhetorically but in practice through generous
interpretation of fair use.''3' The article expressly identifies one
category of fair use in which the harm to the copyright holder is non-
326. Id. (emphasis added).
327. Andrew C. Humes, The Day the Music Died: The RIAA Sues its Consumers, 38
IND.L.REV. 239, 249-250 (2005) (noting that music file sharing may qualify as fair use
under first and fourth factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107, but that the second and third factor
militate against fair-use characterization).
328. William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL.L.REV. 1639 (2004).
329. Id. at 1639.
330. Id. at 1643.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1645.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1645-1646.
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zero but is more than offset by the sum of the benefits to others and
the savings in transaction costs that would be involved if explicit
licensing were required.335 The Posner article also explains why pure
market forces are unlikely to yield licenses for uses that benefit
society more than they harm the copyright.
33 6
Another commentator suggests that fair-use comfortably
accommodates a distinction between uses of intellectual property that
represent consumers as consumers and those in which a consumer is
functioning effectively as a competitor to the rights holder.337 Such a
distinction supports an interpretation of fair use that would privilege
file sharing among friends while leaving commercial file sharing
subject to liability. On the other hand, one must acknowledge that
when a consumer shares files with others (as opposed merely to
copying files for his own time-shifting or space-shifting purposes), he
deprives the rights holder of potential sales, thus becoming the rights
holder's competitor.
While the fair use privilege conceptually accommodates socially
beneficial music file sharing, recent judicial decisions exclude that
possibility. In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,338 the district court
granted a preliminary injunction against the continued operation of
the Napster music file sharing service. In working its way through the
four fair-use factors, the court, noting that, "[i]f a use is non-
commercial, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a meaningful
likelihood that it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work if it became widespread, 339 found:
"Although downloading and uploading MP3 music
files is not paradigmatic commercial activity, it is also not
personal use in the traditional sense. Plaintiffs have not
shown that the majority of Napster users download music
to sell-that is, for profit. However, given the vast scale of
Napster use among anonymous individuals, the court
finds that downloading and uploading MP3 music files
with the assistance of Napster are not private uses. At the
335. Id. at 1649.
336. Id. at 1646 (identifying the desire by rights holders to extract pure windfall, their
reluctance to set precedent, their anxiety that consent would be abused, and their desire
not "to be bothered" by defining privilege of copying).
337. Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright's Fair
Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 431 (2005).
338. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in material part, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1941 (9h Cir 2001).
339. Id. at 912.
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very least, a host user sending a file cannot be said to
engage in a personal use when distributing that file to an
anonymous requester. Moreover, the fact that Napster
users get for free something they would ordinarily have
to buy suggests that they reap economic advantages from
Napster use. '
With little difficulty, the court found that the second and third
factors tilted against the defendants." As to the fourth factor, it
summarized:
"The fourth factor, the effect on the potential
market for the copyrighted work, also weighs against a
finding of fair use. Plaintiffs have produced evidence that
Napster use harms the market for their copyrighted
musical compositions and sound recordings in at least
two ways. First, it reduces CD sales among college
students. Second, it raises barriers to plaintiffs' entry into
the market for the digital downloading of music."342
The court also rejected the argument that Napster use is like
visiting a free listening station in a record store orlistening to song
samples on a retail website because Napster users get to keep the
music they download. 3
The court made an explicit finding of fact that Napster use is
likely to reduce purchases of CDs by college students, who constitute
a major market segment' It found that studies and expert testimony
presented by the defendants did not credibly establish that file
sharing increases CD sales.3 45 Further, the court found that Napster
posed a threat to the market for digital downloads by the rights
holders.'
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,347 the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's conclusion that Napster users do not
engage in fair use.' In particular, it found that copying to avoid
paying for the music constitutes a commercial activity under factor
340. Id.
341. Id. at 913.
342. Id. [internal citations to record omitted].
343. Id. at 913-914.
344. 114 F. Supp.2d at 909-910.
345. Id. at 910.
346. Id.
347. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
348. Id. at 1015.
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one. 49 The court easily found that the works at issue were creative,
thus mobilizing the second factor against a finding of fair use.350 The
court also found that wholesale copying under the third factor was
involved, thus also tilting that factor against the defendants."5 As to
the fourth factor, the court articulated a connection between the
burden of proof on market effect and the position of the defendant on
the other factors:
"If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood [of
market harm] may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial
purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated." '352 The court found no
error in the district court's inferences drawn from the conflict
evidence on market effect.353 Moreover:
"[L]ack of harm to an established market cannot
deprive the copyright holder of the right to develop
alternative markets for the works. Here,... the record
supports the district court's finding that the record
company plaintiffs have already expended considerable
funds and effort to commence Internet sales and
licensing for digital downloads. Having digital downloads
available for free on the Napster system necessarily
harms the copyright holders' attempts to charge for the
same downloads."
"Napster further argues that the district court erred
in rejecting its evidence that the users' downloading of
samples increases or tends to increase audio CD sales.
The district court, however, correctly noted that any
potential enhancement of plaintiffs' sales.., would not
tip the fair use analysis conclusively in favor of
defendant. We agree that increased sales of copyrighted
material attributable to unauthorized use should not
deprive the copyright holder of the right to license the
material. Judge Leval gives the example of the film
producer's appropriation of a composer's previously
unknown song that turns the song into a commercial
success; the boon to the song does not make the film's
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1016.
351. Id.
352. Id. [citations omitted].
353. Id. at 1017.
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simple copying fair. Nor does positive impact in one
market, here the audio CD market, deprive the copyright
holder of the right to develop identified alternative
markets, here the digital download market.,
354
Similarly, in BMG Music v. Gonzalez,355 a panel of the Seventh
Circuit in an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook, gave little
importto a fair-use. defense proffered by a defendant who
downloaded songs through the KaZaA file-sharing network. The
summary judgment record showed that the defendant "downloaded
more than 1,370 copyrighted songs during a few weeks and kept them
on her computer until she was caught. 35 6 The court of appeals held
that "a copy downloaded, played, and retained on one's hard drive
for future use is a direct substitute for a purchased copy-and without
the benefit of the license fee paid to the broadcaster,, 357 thus vitiating
any argument that time shifting or "space shifting" was all that was
involved .3 Reproducing the four factors of sec. 107, the court noted
that she "was not engaged in a non-profit use," It is not clear whether
the court misread the first factor as being limited to non-profit
educational activity or whether it concluded that the defendant's
activity was somehow commercial in nature. She downloaded
complete songs, thus dooming her on the second and third factors. So
the focus was on the fourth factor. She argued that "downloading on
a try-before-you-buy basis is good advertising for copyright
proprietors, expanding the value of their inventory." '359 The court of
appeals, relying on Grokster, concluded that file sharing such as that
engaged in by the defendant hurts the market for purchased music.3"
The court did not explain why application of the fourth factor
necessitated a trial; the facts are in dispute over the market impact of
file sharing.
In Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., 6' the district court
denied summary judgment to plaintiff record companies because they
had produced insufficient evidence of distribution to the public of
copyrighted MP3 files pointed to by links on the defendant's website.
354. Id. at 1018 [quotations and citations omitted].
355. 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005).
356. 430 F.3d at 889.
357. Id. at 890.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id at 890.
361. Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660 (SHS), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11392 (S.D. N.Y. Jul. 2, 2003).
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It found sufficient evidence to warrant an inference of distribution,
but not that the distribution was to the public.362 Without finding the
need for much factual or legal analysis, the district rejected a fair-use
defense, finding that all four factors tilted against the defendants.
3 63
It is conceivable that a test case could be organized that would
result in a more flexible application of the fair use privilege to
distinguish different types of file sharing, along the lines suggested by
Lessig. That would be an uphill battle, however, considering the
absence of favorable judicial precedent involving file sharing.
D. Market or Law-Reform?
The ultimate question is whether copyright law should be
reformed by the Congress to permit new technologies to flourish, and
to work their own reform of the way music is created, produced,
disseminated and consumed, or whether the market will work things
out better than the legislature can.
It is likely that the current legal regime along with the operation
of the marketplace and a considerable amount of "civil
disobedience," to use Professor Lunney's characterization, will
produce socially optimal results-better results than would be
produced by any attempt to amend the copyright statute. Despite
their victories in the Grokster case and the effects of their aggressive
litigation strategy against individuals participating in file
downloading, the established music intermediaries know that they are
fighting a losing battle with new technologies. Indeed their
aggressiveness in the political and judicial arenas may be animated by
this realization, accompanied by an economically rational desire to
exploit their embedded capital as long possible before they are forced
to give in.
They are under growing pressure to participate in "legitimate"
downloading services such as iTunes. These services may produce a
revenue stream smaller than the lost revenue stream from diminished
CD sales, while nevertheless giving music producers a way to provide
to music consumers much of what they get-indeed arguably more
than what they get-from "stealing" the music through peer to peer
file sharing services. So the suppliers have an incentive to migrate to
new technology platforms and new business models.
Similarly, the demand functions discussed earlier in this article
suggest that much more than price motivates consumers to pick one
362. Id. at *4.
363. Id. at *13.
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music source or another. The convenience of "legitimate"
downloading services and the reduced risk of getting corrupted files
are already sufficiently powerful to have generated double-digit
growth rates for iTunes. In addition, the threat of being haled into
court and forced to defend an expensive lawsuit, if not to pay
damages, doubtless operates at the margin to drive additional
consumers away from the illegal peer to peer services to "legitimate"
services.
That provides the foundation for new equilibrium-one in which
the latest technologies are mobilized by everyone to facilitate the
creation and distribution of music. A residue of people would still
exist who exchange files informally with each other, whether by
handing each others CDs or by sharing MP3 files over the Internet.
When they do so, they technically commit prima facie infringement.
The Fair Use Doctrine, although it has not been interpreted very
charitably toward those sharing music files in recent cases, and
although it does suffer from the transaction costs identified by
Professor Lessig, nevertheless remains available as a potential safe
harbor for informal copying and sharing, which is likely to increase
demand for music.
In the end, it probably is a safer political risk to entrust evolution
of the Fair Use Doctrine to the market and to the courts rather than
to put in motion a legislative process that is highly likely to be
captured by the well organized established music intermediaries. It
will produce better results to rely on the entrepreneurial instincts of
musicians and designers of new forms of Internet-based
intermediation and on the resourcefulness of consumers than erecting
new legal schemes that will certainly get in the way.
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